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1 Executive Summary  
 
Antineutrinos are electrically neutral, nearly massless fundamental particles produced in large numbers in the 
cores of nuclear reactors and in nuclear explosions. In the half century since their discovery, major advances in 
the understanding of their properties, and in detector technology, have opened the door to a new discipline – 
Applied Antineutrino Physics. Because antineutrinos are inextricably linked to the process of nuclear fission, 
many applications of interest are in nuclear nonproliferation.  
 
The current state of the art in antineutrino detection is such that it is now possible to monitor the operational 
status, power levels, and fissile content of nuclear reactors in real time with simple detectors at distances of a 
few tens of meters. This has already been demonstrated at civil power reactors in Russia and the United States, 
with detectors designed specifically for reactor monitoring and safeguards
1,2
. This existing near-field 
monitoring capability may be useful in the context of the International Atomic Energy Agency‘s (IAEA) 
Safeguards Regime
3
, and other cooperative monitoring regimes, such as the proposed Fissile Material Cutoff 
Treaty
4
  
 
Though not part of any existing treaty, today‘s technology would allow cooperative monitoring, discovery or 
exclusion of small (few MegaWatt thermal, MWt) reactors at standoff distances  up to 10 kilometers. In 
principle, discovery and exclusion is also possible at longer ranges, as is standoff nuclear explosion detection at 
the kiloton level. However, the  required detector masses are 10-100 times greater than the state of the art, and 
achieving these long range detection goals would require significant research and development on several 
fronts.  Many elements of the necessary R&D program are already being pursued in the fundamental physics 
community, in the form of very large neutrino detection experiments.  
 
Antineutrino detectors are likely not useful for detection or monitoring of quiescent, non-critical fissile 
materials, regardless of the amount of material or the size of the detector, because emission rates from these 
materials are vastly lower than from critical systems.   
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This white paper presents a comprehensive survey of applied antineutrino physics relevant for nonproliferation, 
summarizes recent advances in the field, describes the overlap of this nascent discipline with other ongoing 
fundamental and applied antineutrino research, and charts a course for research and development for future 
applications. It is intended as a resource for policymakers, researchers, and the wider nuclear nonproliferation 
community. 
 
The conclusions and recommendations of this white paper are:  
1) Practical mear-field (<100 m) monitoring of pressurized water reactors with antineutrino detectors has 
been demonstrated
1,2
, and offers a promising complement to existing reactor monitoring methods for 
IAEA and other safeguards regimes. We recommend further investigation of near-field antineutrino 
monitoring capabilities for providing reactor operational status, thermal power and fissile content of 
reactors for safeguards. In particular, further R&D is appropriate in determining sensitivity levels at 
non-PWR reactors, in direct measurement and simulation of the evolution of antineutrino rates and 
spectra at various reactors, and in detectors with improved deployability characteristics. We further 
recommend close cooperation between the antineutrino physics community, the IAEA and relevant 
government agencies worldwide to ensure that development is well matched to safeguards needs.  
2)  Mid-field (1-10 kilometer) monitoring of the operational status, and presence or absence of 10 MWt 
reactors, and placing upper limits on plutonium production in such reactors, is possible with existing 
technology, assuming deeply buried (1 kilometer overburden) detectors and in parts of the world with 
few commercial reactor backgrounds. We recommend development of 1000-10,000 ton scale detectors 
with dual physics and nonproliferation aims.  We further recommend R&D focus on reducing costs 
through, among other options, reduction in overburden while maintaining suitable signal to 
background levels, and improvements in collection of the light generated by antineutrino interactions 
in water and scintillator detectors. Since they will normally occur within the borders of a country, mid-
field monitoring regimes are likely to be cooperative in nature: we therefore recommend policy studies 
and cost-benefit analyses of cooperative deployments in the context of current or future treaties and 
agreements.   
3) Far-field (10-500 kilometer) monitoring of the presence or absence and operational status of 10 MWt 
reactors, and placing upper limits on plutonium production in such reactors, would require detectors at 
the 10,000 ton to 10,000,000 ton (10 Megaton) scale. For cost reasons, these would likely be 
composed of pure water doped with neutron capture agents. U.S. and international groups have 
proposed detectors of this kind at the 100,000 ton scale. These proposals are now in the Conceptual 
Design phase in with funding agencies, with the aim of achieving a variety of fundamental physics 
goals. We recommend that the technical nonproliferation community actively engage in these 
experimental and planning efforts. Such participation will help ensure that the best technologies from 
fundamental science are brought to bear on the nonproliferation problem. Similarly, the policy 
community as well as scientific and nonproliferation funding agencies, should analyze the 
consequences of the existence of such detectors, and in particular should consider planning scenarios 
and co-investment in projects involving joint physics and nonproliferation goals.  
4) Detection of nuclear detonation offers the unique possibility of unambiguous remote confirmation of 
the nuclear nature of the event. Unfortunately, this capability is possibly the most challenging topic 
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discussed in this white paper. As discussed in earlier unclassified reports
5
, 10-100 kilometer range of 
foreseeable detectors for 1 kiloton yield fission explosions appears most suitable for cooperative 
monitoring of test sites in relatively proscribed circumstances
. 
While there are differences in 
backgrounds due to the burst-like character of the fission bomb antineutrino pulse, much of the 
necessary detector development research will be accomplished in the course of R&D 
recommendations 2) and 3) above. In a policy context, we recommend analysis of the potential impact 
of various cooperative deployments on CTBT and other future test-ban verification regimes.  
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2 Introduction   
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This white paper presents a comprehensive survey of applied antineutrino physics relevant for nonproliferation, 
summarizes recent advances in the field, describes the overlap of this nascent discipline with other ongoing 
fundamental and applied antineutrino research, and charts a course for research and development for future 
applications. It is intended as a resource for policymakers, researchers, and the wider nonproliferation 
community. 
 
The paper is organized as follows.  
 
In section 3 we give a general overview of the information that antineutrino detectors can provide for reactor 
monitoring, reactor finding and nuclear explosion detection, and provide illustrative examples of deployments.  
In section 4 we describe the physics of antineutrino production and detection relevant for nuclear reactors and 
nuclear explosions in further detail. 
In section 5, we consider ‗near-field‘ (10 meters to 1 kilometer) applications of antineutrino detectors in further 
detail, with an emphasis on existing demonstrations of cooperative monitoring and safeguards of nuclear 
reactors. We review current IAEA safeguards practices at different reactors, consider possible benefits of 
antineutrino detectors in the context of safeguards, and describe the state of the art for antineutrino detection as 
applied to near-field monitoring. We also present a set of general requirements for near-field deployments, and 
describe research and development priorities for improved near field monitoring antineutrino detectors.  
In section 6, we survey current and potential capabilities for finding operating reactors or excluding their 
presence in the ‗mid-field‘ (1 to 10 kilometers standoff), and describe research and development priorities for 
detectors at this standoff distance.  
In section 7, we survey capabilities and potential for ‗far field‘ (10- 500 kilometer standoff) reactor finding and 
explosion detection, and enumerate research and development priorities for these very large scale detectors.  
In section 8, we summarize ongoing fundamental physics research that is relevant for applied antineutrino 
physics.  
We conclude with a discussion of the overlapping  R&D priorities for applied and fundamental antineutrino 
physics.  
3 Overview and Examples of Antineutrino-Based Measurements of 
Nonproliferation Interest 
 
The possible utility of the antineutrino signal for nonproliferation is easily understood apart from detailed 
production and detection mechanisms, which are described in section 4. In descending order of accessibility 
with current technology, the measurements of interest for the applications discussed in this white paper are:  
 
the antineutrino rate from a given source, whether a reactor or a fission bomb; 
the antineutrino energy spectrum; and   
the antineutrino direction.  
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1. Information derived from antineutrino rate measurements.  
 
The emitted antineutrino rate from reactors depends on the thermal power and fissile isotopic content of the 
reactor. The antineutrino rate can therefore be used to measure the reactor operational status (off/on) and power 
continuously and in real time. If the reactor power and initial fuel loading are known by other means, and the 
antineutrino event rates are sufficiently high (roughly, hundreds or thousands of events per day or week) the 
antineutrino rate can be used to estimate the evolving amounts of fissile uranium and plutonium in the reactor 
core. For a given fuel type, the degree of neutron irradiation primarily determines these changing amounts of 
fissile material, and is referred to as the ‗burnup‘. The fuel burnup at discharge directly correlates with the 
amount of plutonium in spent fuel, and is an important parameter in the context of reactor safeguards. 
 
Many experiments worldwide have performed antineutrino rate measurements at reactors
6,7
. These fundamental 
physics experiments are described in section 8.1. Two experiments, described in section 5.3, have been built 
specifically to demonstrate reactor monitoring capability in the context of nuclear safeguards.
1,2
  
 
The antineutrino rate from nuclear explosions depends on the fission yield and fissile isotopic content of the 
explosion. The short burst of antineutrinos emitted by a nuclear weapon can therefore be used to measure the 
total fission yield of a nuclear explosion, as well is to confirm that the explosion is indeed due to fission. An 
earlier study
5
 has provided a detailed examination of the utility, detector characteristics, and costs for fission 
explosion detectors.  
 
2. Information derived from the antineutrino energy spectrum  
 
Like the antineutrino rate, the antineutrino energy spectrum depends on the reactor power and fissile isotopic 
content. Estimates of both the reactor fissile isotopic content and its thermal power can be derived from spectral 
measurements, without the need for independent measurement of the reactor thermal power, provided sufficient 
statistics are available. As with rate measurements, antineutrino spectral measurements have been made in 
numerous fundamental physics experiments
6,7,8
. Theoretical estimates have also been made of reactor 
antineutrino spectra for the major fissile isotopes
9,10
. These are accurate to a few percent, and are derived 
primarily from experimentally measured fission product electron spectra of these isotopes
11,12
. In combination 
with models of the reactor fuel evolution, such as ORIGEN
13
, the antineutrino spectrum of a given reactor can 
be predicted. Further information on antineutrino spectral analysis for reactor monitoring is provided in section 
4.1.5.   
 
3. Information derived from the antineutrino direction  
 
Finally, the antineutrino direction can in principle be used to infer the location of a bomb or reactor. 
Directionality is difficult to measure, for reasons described in later chapters. However, the Chooz collaboration 
has successfully reconstructed the direction of antineutrinos from a known reactor source with a pointing 
accuracy of approximately 20 degrees
14
. 
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These three types of measurements underlie all of the potential uses of antineutrino detectors that are described 
in the following sections. To further orient the reader to the possibilities, Figure 1 displays a number of possible 
deployment options, distinguished by range and by overburden. The sidebar presents examples of 
measurements that could be made currently or in the near term at three distance scales of interest. These ranges 
scales are: 
1) Near-field 10 meters – 1 kilometer from a nuclear power or research reactor,  
2) Mid-field 1-10 kilometers from a nuclear reactor, and  
3) Far-field  10 km and beyond  from a nuclear explosion or a nuclear reactor.  
 
We will return to these examples, with more detail in specific cases, in the application sections of the paper.   
 
 
Figure 1: Represenative deployment scenarios for antineutrino detectors.  The 1 ton SONGS1 and 1000 ton KamLand 
detectors have been deployed and have operated for several years.  
 
Figure 2, is a summary graph of the size of the detector as a function of distance from a 10 MWt reactors. 
Because of the highly penetrating power of antineutrinos, shielding and attenuation calculations, such as those 
required for gamma and neutron detection, are irrelevant for the purposes of calculating signal rates. For a given 
interaction and detector type, the main variables influencing detector size are the distance from the source, the 
source strength, (fissile yield or reactor thermal power), and the amount of shielding against ambient 
backgrounds . (There is also a comparatively small correction factor due to antineutrino oscillations, described 
later, that depends on the ratio of the antineutrino energy and the reactor standoff distance.) 
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Figure 2: A plot of the required detector mass (in kilotons) for a given standoff  distance (in km) and application, assuming 
zero background, and using the most commonly employed antineutrino detector interaction (inverse beta decay). Discovery 
refers to confirming the presence of a 10 MWt reactor within one year with >5 events.  Measuring annual output with 16 
measured events in 1 year would provide an estimate of the reactor thermal power with 25% precision.  Measuring daily 
operations would require 3600 events/year, measuring monthly spectra would require 36K events per year, and daily spectra 
would require about 3000 events per day.  Most of the scaling behavior is determined by the inverse square dependence of the 
antineutrino flux. The kinks in each curve are caused by the known effect of reactor antineutrino oscillations, first measured 
by the KamLAND experiment
8
. Further information about reactor antineutrino oscillations is found in section 8.1.  
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3.1 Representative Applications of Antineutrino Monitoring  
The following table provides representative examples of nonproliferation applications of antineutrino detection 
in the near, middle and far field.  
Near-Field reactor monitoring :  
An antineutrino detector deployed at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) in Southern 
California.has been used to non-intrusively monitor the operational status, relative thermal power, and changes 
in fissile content of a 3.64 GWt reactor. The 640 kg (0.64 ton) detector operated at 24.5 meter standoff.  The 
reactor operational status (on or off) is detected within 5 hours of shut down or start up at the 99% confidence 
level. The reactor power, relative to a known initial value, is measured with 3% accuracy in one week. With 
known constant reactor power and fuel loading, changes in fissile content corresponding to consumption of 500 
kg of 235U and production of ~80 kg of Pu are observable in approximately 4 months. Further improvements can 
be expected with additional effort. Spectral measurements providing a more robust constraint on the reactor 
evolution are also possible. With approximately the same size detector at 5 meter standoff, similar precision for 
power and operational status could be obtained for a 100 MWt research reactor.  
The deployment is described further in section 5.  
Midfield reactor operation/exclusion/discovery:  The  largest currently operational reactor antineutrino 
detector is known as KamLAND (the Kamioka Large Antineutrino Detector) 8. KamLAND is a 500 ton fiducial 
massa (1000 ton total mass) liquid scintillator detector, operating at 1000 meters overburden. With this detector 
and overburden, the operation of a 10 MWt reactor could be excluded in a 10 kilometer radius in 3 months.  
With no other reactors present, the measured antineutrino rate would be approximately 24 events per year for an 
85% efficient detector such as KamLAND. With known KamLAND backgrounds of about 1 antineutrino-like 
event per month, 95% confidence of detection would be obtained in approximately 3 months. If a reactor is 
discovered, its power could be estimated to within 25% in approximately 8 months. Additional known or 
unknown reactors would change the background levels and alter the detector size requirements. Midfield 
applications are considered in section 6.  
Far-Field reactor exclusion/discovery:: The operation of a 10 MWt reactor could be excluded within an 800 
kilometer radius with a 1,000,000 ton (1 Megaton, fiducial mass) water Cerenkov antineutrino detector. 
Detectors of this scale are now being proposed by various physics collaborations in the United States and abroad. 
The measured antineutrino rate would be approximately 5 events per year for a 85% efficient detector. The rate 
includes the effect of neutrino oscillations, described below, which must be taken into account at this distance. A 
key R&D consideration is that the dominant cosmic-ray backgrounds in the detector would have to be 
suppressed by a factor of about 30  - per unit of detector mass  - relative to the KamLAND detector. 95% 
confidence of detection would be obtained in approximately 1 year.  Again, additional known or unknown 
reactors would change the background levels and alter the detector size requirements.  Far-field reactor 
applications and background considerations are examined in section 7. 
Far-field nuclear explosion detection: the fissile nature and approximate yield of a 10 kton explosion at 250 
kilometer standoff could be confirmed with a 1,000,000 ton water Cerenkov detector. An 85% efficient detector 
                                                   
 
a
 The fiducial mass is defined as the fraction of the total detector mass within which valid antineutrino events are recorded. In the 
present context, the outermost thickness of the total mass of the detector is used as a shield against external backgrounds to create a 
central fiducial region.  
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would record 2-3 events in a few seconds from such an explosion. Oscillation effects are included in this rate 
estimate. Far-field nuclear explosion detection is considered in Section  7.5. 
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4 Production and Detection of Antineutrinos From Nuclear Reactors and Nuclear Explosions  
 
4.1 Brief Description of Reactor Monitoring with Antineutrinos 
 
In this section we provide a summary description of the behavior of the antineutrino signal emitted by the most 
common type of nuclear reactor, a Light Water Reactor (LWR) fueled with Low Enriched Uranium (LEU). This 
signal is modified significantly for different reactor types, such as fast fission reactors, and these modifications 
are considered in sections 4.1.5 and 5.4.  
As an LWR proceeds through its irradiation cycle, the inventory of each fissioning isotope varies in time. 
Neutrons cause fission of uranium and plutonium, while the competing process of neutron capture on 
238
U 
produces plutonium. As a consequence, the relative fission rates of the isotopes vary significantly throughout 
the reactor cycle, even when constant power is maintained. This phenomenon is shown in Figure 3, a plot of 
fractional fission rates for a typical cycle of a Light Water Reactor (LWR), operating at constant power over 
600 days. 
235
U and 
239
Pu contribute the most fissions: although it accounts for most of the mass of the reactor 
core, 
238
U can be fissioned only with MeV-scale or ―fast‖ neutrons and contributes only about 10% of the total 
fissions in these reactors, in which the neutron population is mostly sub-eV scale or ―thermal‖.  
 
 
Figure 3: The fractional fission rates of the main fissile isotopes in a Light Water Reactor plotted versus cycle day.   
This ongoing change in fissile content induces a systematic shift in the detected antineutrino flux and energy 
spectrum over the course of the cycle, known as the ―burnup effect‖. Burnup, in units of Gigawatt-days per ton 
of heavy metal (GWd/THM), measures the integrated thermal power output of the fuel per unit of fuel mass. It 
effectively tracks total neutron exposure of the fuel, and therefore uranium consumption and plutonium 
production in the core.  
The burnup effect has been measured in past reactor antineutrino experiments
1
, and is an important 
consideration for near-field reactor monitoring applications. While the total antineutrino emission rate per 
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fission is about the same for the main fissile isotopes, the emission rate per fission varies significantly among 
these isotopes in the energy regime (1.8-10 MeV) where reactor antineutrinos are most readily detected. 
Because of the measurable rate differences in detected number of events from the main fissile isotopes, the 
evolving state of the core is reflected in both the measured antineutrino rate and energy spectrum.  
 
The size of this effect depends on the core type, fuel management strategy, and fuel composition. For example, 
in a standard 1.5 year cycle of operation of a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR), the net decrease in 
235
U content 
and increase in fissile Pu
 
content are roughly 1500 kg and 250 kg respectively.. This gradual consumption and 
ingrowth causes a gradual reduction in the antineutrino rate of about 12% over the same time period.  
 
Figure 4 shows the size of the burnup effect relative to an initial value, as simulated for a LEU-fueled PWR.  In 
Sections 5 and 8, we show that this predicted effect has been clearly confirmed by several reactor antineutrino 
experiments, can be seen even with detectors of simple design, and can be used to estimate the fissile content of 
the reactor throughout the cycle, including the burnup of discharged fuel.  
 
 
Figure 4: The change in the daily emitted antineutrino rate across a typical LEU fueled PWR cycle. The rate is normalized to 1 at the 
beginning of cycle, and the reactor operates at constant power throughout the cycle. In this example, the antineutrino rate changes by 
approximately 12% over the course of a 600 day cycle.  
 
Summarizing points to be explained in more detail later, an estimate of the operational state of the reactor, the 
reactor power, and the reactor plutonium inventory can be obtained from either of two quantities measured by 
an antineutrino detector: the total antineutrino rate integrated over a broad energy window, as just described, or 
the energy spectrum of the detected antineutrinos. To further explain the connection between these measured 
quantities and nonproliferation metrics of interest, we describe reactor antineutrino production and detection 
processes in more detail. 
4.1.1 Production of Antineutrinos in Reactors 
 
Antineutrino emission in nuclear reactors arises from the -decay of neutron-rich fragments produced in heavy 
element fissions. The average fission is followed by the production of about six antineutrinos, which 
corresponds to the average number of -decays required for the fission daughters to reach stability. For a typical 
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power reactor, the thermal power output is about 3 GWT, and the energy release per fission is about 200 MeV.  
For such reactors, therefore, the number of antineutrinos emitted from the core is approximately 10
21
 per 
second. These emerge from the core isotropically and without attenuation.  
 
The antineutrino energy distribution contains spectral contributions from the dozens of beta-decaying fission 
daughters. Precise estimates of the distribution have been derived from beta spectrometry measurements
9,10,11,12
, 
and validated by many reactor experiments
14,15,16
. An approximate formula for the antineutrino energy density 
per fission is  
)(exp
2
cEbEa
dE
dN
, 
where E is the energy of the antineutrino in MeV, and the coefficients a,b, and c are specific to each fissile 
isotope. The mean energy of the emitted antineutrinos is similar for all fissile isotopes, approximately 1.5 MeV.  
 
4.1.2 Reactor Antineutrino Interaction Mechanisms 
4.1.2.1 Inverse Beta Decay  
 
The most commonly used and practical method for detecting reactor antineutrinos is the well understood 
inverse beta decay interaction: 
 
1)  
nepe .                                                     
 
Here the antineutrino ( ) interacts with free protons (p) present in the detection medium. The numerical value 
of the cross section per target proton for this interaction is of order 10
-43 
cm
2
, which is large in comparison to 
most other possible antineutrino interaction mechanisms, and which enables cubic meter scale detectors at tens 
of meter standoff from standard power reactors. The neutron (n) and positron (e+) are detected in close time 
coincidence, providing a dual-event signature that stands out strongly against backgrounds. In addition to the 
antineutrino flux, the antineutrino energy is accessible through the measured positron energy. The quantities are 
related by the formula: 
 
2   
)(
p
e
enpe
M
m
OmMMEE
            
where 
E
 is the antineutrino energy, e
E
 is the positron kinetic energy, np
MM  ,
and e
m
are the proton, neutron 
and electron masses respectively, and 
)(
p
e
M
m
O
are terms of order p
e
M
m
that mainly account for the nuclear recoil. 
The reaction in (1) has an energy-dependent cross-section and a threshold of ~1.81 MeV. 
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4.1.2.2 Other Interaction Mechanisms 
 
Radiochemical methods, antineutrino-electron scattering and coherent antineutrino-nucleus scattering 
mechanisms are all possible methods for detecting reactor antineutrinos.  
Radiochemical methods refers to a family of possible inverse beta decay interactions with various nuclei, 
following the generic process 
 
3) )1,(),( ZAeQZAe  
Where Q is the energy threshold for the interaction, and A and Z are respectively the mass number and proton 
number of the target nucleus. The interaction probabilities decrease with increasing Z, and energy thresholds 
vary with isotope
17
.  Accounting for these effects, only a few targets have rates comparable with the inverse 
beta decay process on protons, most notably the transition  
 
HHe 33 ,  
 
which has a very low (0.018 MeV) energy threshold. Generally, these approaches are undesirable for detection 
on time scales of days to months, either because the materials are inconvenient or expensive is in the case of He, 
or because they involve radiochemical recovery of converted isotopes following long exposure times. Concepts 
of operation involving long acquisition times might still employ detectors of this kind.  
 
Antineutrino-electron scattering involves the exchange of a neutral Z0 gauge boson with an electron in a 
convenient target medium, with water being a common choice. It has an approximately 100–fold lower 
interaction probability per target than inverse beta decay, requiring correspondingly larger detector sizes, and is 
therefore not as readily applicable for security applications. A further limitation of this ‗neutral current‘ 
interaction is that it is equally sensitive to antineutrinos and neutrinos, and so that solar neutrinos are a 
background process, unlike the inverse beta decay process on protons, which is sensitive to antineutrinos only.  
 
Coherent antineutrino-nucleus scattering is collective neutral current interaction that occurs via coherent 
summing of Z0 exchange amplitudes between the antineutrino and all the nucleons in any nucleus
18
. The 
coherent addition of nucleon amplitudes makes the interaction probability significantly higher than inverse beta 
decay on protons, by factors of 10-100. While theoretically very well motivated, the very low energy transfer in 
the process makes it extremely difficult to detect – indeed no experiment has yet succeeded in measuring 
coherent neutrino scattering.  This high-rate but difficult to detect interaction may nonetheless be of interest in 
some practical applications, and is discussed in more detail in section 8.4. As with antineutrino-electron 
scattering, it suffers from an irreducible solar neutrino background. which for this interaction limits the useful 
standoff distance from reactors to a few kilometers, beyond which distance solar and reactor fluxes are 
comparable.  
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4.1.3 Reactor Antineutrino Detection and Background Rejection  
 
Historically, organic liquid scintillator has been the most common choice of detection medium for reactor 
antineutrinos. It can be obtained in large quantities at low cost, has a high density of free proton targets to 
enable reaction (1), and it can be doped with different neutron capture elements to enhance sensitivity to the 
neutron in the final state of the antineutrino interaction.  
 
Detection with liquid scintillator has been standard in nuclear physics ever since the early experiments leading 
to the discovery of the antineutrino. Modern liquid scintillator detectors, such as Rovno
2 
,SONGS1
19
, Chooz
7
 
and Palo Verde
6
, have fiducial masses of several tons and have run for a few years each, with total detector-
related systematic errors on the absolute antineutrino count rate as low as 3%. These detectors have very good 
time stability, compatibility with plastic hardware and relatively modest health hazards.  
 
In the process (1), both the positron and the neutron are detected in close time coincidence compared to other 
backgrounds. The positron and its annihilation gamma-rays produce scintillation signals within a few 
nanoseconds of the antineutrino interaction: this is collectively referred to as the prompt scintillation signal. 
This is followed by a second, delayed scintillation flash arising from the cascade of gamma-rays which come 
from decay of the excited nuclear state of the neutron-absorbing element following neutron capture. The 
scintillation light is recorded in photomultiplier tubes, with the number of scintillation photons proportional to 
the deposited positron and neutron-related energies, and the time of each deposition recorded. This time 
correlated pair of MeV-scale energy depositions, with the prompt and delayed signals separated by only a few 
tens or hundreds of microseconds, stands out strongly against backgrounds.  
 
The neutron capture can occur on hydrogen, for which a 2.2 MeV gamma-ray is released. Often, a dopant with a 
high neutron-absorption cross-section is used, to improve the robustness of the signal. This brings the dual 
benefits of reducing the capture time and increasing the energy released in the gamma cascade following 
capture, compared to 2.2 MeV for hydrogen. For example, a 0.1% concentration of gadolinium, which has the 
highest neutron absorption cross-section of any element, reduces the capture time from about 200 microseconds 
to tens of microseconds relative to hydrogen, and increases to 8 MeV the neutron-related energy available for 
deposition in the detector (arising from neutron capture de-excitation gamma-rays).  
 
For the relatively small detectors needed for near-field reactor safeguards it is also possible to use non-
hazardous liquid scintillators, blocks of solid plastic scintillator coated with neutron capture agents, doped water 
Cerenkov detectors, and other approaches, all of which can improve deployability and ease of use of the system. 
These alternatives are also discussed in section 5.5. For mid -field detection, strategies such as segmentation 
and improved particle identification may be of use for the more stringent background rejection requirements 
imposed by the reduced flux available beyond 1 km. These alternatives are also discussed in section 6. For far-
field detection of reactors (or nuclear explosions), only large homogeneous liquid scintillator or doped water 
Cerenkov detectors appear practical, as is discussed in section 7.  
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Aside from the neutrino oscillation effect that appear at very long ranges, the signal event rate falls off simply 
as the squared distance to the reactor or reactors, with no other attenuation effects even at Earth diameter 
standoff. However, as discussed later, relatively small systematic corrections to this oscillation, at the few 
percent level, may be revealed at the few kilometer standoff by a next generation of neutrino oscillation 
experiments.  
 
Backgrounds depend in a more complicated way on overburden and nearby materials. Backgrounds are usually 
separated into ‗correlated‘ and ‗uncorrelated‘ types. Correlated backgrounds are those for which a single 
physical process is responsible for both the apparent positron and neutron signals, such as muon induced 
9
Li, or 
multiple neutron scattering. Uncorrelated backgrounds arise from two independent physical processes, such as 
two random gamma-ray interactions occurring within the time window that defines the antineutrino signal.  
 
The cosmic ray muon flux, which is responsible for much of the correlated background, falls off exponentially 
with overburden. Overburden is usually expressed in meters of water equivalent (mwe).  At distances relevant 
for near-field cooperative monitoring, out to approximately 1 km, overburdens ranging from 10-300 mwe have 
been shown to give sufficiently good signal to background ratios for precision measurements of the antineutrino 
flux at levels relevant for reactor monitoring applications. The KamLAND detector, currently the sole example 
of a dedicated far-field reactor antineutrino detector, with sensitivity to reactors at 200 km standoff and beyond, 
has an overburden of about 2700 mwe (or 1 kilometer of earth).  
 
For both near and far field detection, an active muon ‗veto‘ system is normally used to time-stamp the passing 
of muons through or near the main detector, allowing further rejection of muon-related backgrounds. These 
systems may consist for example of plastic or liquid scintillator read by photomultiplier tubes – several other 
options have also been used.  
 
Various combinations of lead and/or steel for gamma-ray attenuation, and polyethylene, water and other 
materials for neutron attenuation are used as passive shields to reduce the uncorrelated backgrounds, which 
arise from local ambient neutrons and gamma-rays. The thickness of these shields are of the order 0.5-2 meters, 
depending on the signal strength and target signal to background ratio for the particular experiment. The 
practical considerations related to shielding and overburden in the context of cooperative monitoring, are 
described further in section 5.5, Since only a few experiments have been built specifically for cooperative 
monitoring, further optimization of shielding and overburden in the context of cooperative monitoring 
experiments is likely possible.   
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4.1.4 Rate Measurements and the Burnup Equation  
 
Having discussed the production and interaction mechanisms, we turn to the detailed features of the antineutrino 
signal as measured through the inverse beta decay process. N , the total rate of detected antineutrinos, is 
directly related to a sum over the fission rates of each fissile isotope.  Following Klimov
2
, this explicit 
dependence of the antineutrino rate on the individual isotopic fission rates can be factored as  
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For all parameters, the index i=5,8,9,1 extends over the four main fissioning isotopes 235U, 238U, 239Pu and 
241
Pu. The factorization allows for a simplified parametrization of the equation, to be described below, and 
emphasizes the dominant contribution from 
235
U (i=5) over most of the reactor cycle.  
pN  is the number of target protons, W is the thermal power, R  the standoff distance and  is the detection 
efficiency. i is the cross section for the inverse beta interaction, averaged over the emitted antineutrino energy 
distribution for the isotope i: 
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In the above,  p is the inverse beta decay cross section, i
i
dE
dN
 is the number of antineutrinos emitted by 
isotope i in the energy range idE , and the integral extends from the inverse beta decay reaction threshold of 1.8 
MeV up to the maximum antineutrino energy of roughly 10 MeV.   
Ei is the energy release per fission. t is time at which the rate is calculated, and i (t) is a dimensionless time 
dependent parameter, defined as the fraction of the total fission rate arising from isotope i, with the 
normalization 
 
 
1
i
i .  
Throughout the cycle, the fractional fission rates αi (t) change as 
235
U is consumed and 
239
Pu is produced. This 
introduces a time dependence to the antineutrino rate, as discussed below. Based on an ORIGEN simulation of a 
PWR, representative values of αi at beginning and end of cycle are shown in Table 1  Also shown in the table 
are the fixed values of σi  and Ei .  
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Isotope Energy averaged 
cross-section per 
fission (σi, 10
-43
 cm
2
 )
 
Energy 
release per 
fission  
(Ei, MeV) 
fission fractions  
(αi) beginning of 
cycle  
fission fractions  
(αi), end of cycle 
235
U 6.38 201.7±0.6 0.763 0.423 
239
Pu 4.18 210.0±0.9 0.162 0.397 
238
U 8.89 205.0±0.9 0.0476 0.076 
241
Pu 5.76 212.4±1.0 0.027 0.102 
Table 1: The isotopic parameters used to calculate the antineutrino rate throughout the cycle. The fission fractions are derived 
from an ORIGEN simulation of a representative commercial PWR. The values for the energy release from fission and energy 
averaged cross sections are from references [20] and [2] respectively.  
The final term, ),( ERPee depends on the antineutrino energy and the standoff distance, and accounts for 
neutrino oscillations. Its value is unity for reactor antineutrinos for standoff distances of 500 m or less, but may 
be reduced by as much as several percent at 1 km, and is known to be approximately 60% at 200 km. Figure 5, 
produced by the KamLAND collaboration
21
, shows the effect of the change in Pee on the measured antineutrino 
rate as a function of the standoff distance R, for a large set of reactor antineutrino experiments. Past and ongoing 
neutrino oscillation experiments, which have measured or will measure this correction at this distance and 
greater distances, are discussed further in section 8.1.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: The ratio of observed to expected antineutrino events as a function of standoff from a reactor. This ratio is a 
measure of the strength of the oscillation term ),( ERPee  in Equation 4.  Plot courtesy of the KamLAND collaboration
22
. 
 
Equation 4 can be simplified as:  
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is a ratio of sums over the time-varying relative fission rates of the individual isotopes. )(tW is thermal power of 
the reactor with a possible time dependence now explicitly shown.  
Equation 5 reveals the time/burnup dependent nature of the antineutrino rate. Using the parameters from Table 
1, the equation shows that even for a reactor operating at constant thermal power, the parameter k(t) changes by 
about 10-12 percent throughout a typical modern LWR reactor cycle, as 
235
U is consumed and 
239
Pu is produced 
and consumed in the core. The result is specific to an LEU-fueled LWR. Other reactor types, such as Canadian 
Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactor, fast breeder reactors, or MOX-fueled reactors, will exhibit different 
variations in the antineutrino rate over the course of the fuel cycle.  
 
In a ‗typical‘ reactor antineutrino experiment, Equation 5 is used to predict the antineutrino rate, based on 
thermal power measurements provided by the reactor operator, and on a detailed simulation of the fissile 
isotopic content of the core as it changes over the course of the reactor fuel cycle. Proprietary codes provided by 
reactor operators, or publicly available simulation tools such as the ORIGEN/SCALE package
23
 are used for 
this purpose. Predicted and measured rates are then compared to look for the anomalous behavior characteristic 
of antineutrino oscillations.  
 
For reactor monitoring applications, the procedure used in the oscillation experiments is inverted:  the reactor‘s 
fissile content is estimated or constrained using the measured antineutrino rate N . If only rate information is 
available, additional inputs are required to extract such an estimate: the fuel geometry, the initial fuel 
enrichment and isotopics, the reactor thermal power W, the detection efficiency, and the predicted fissile 
isotopic evolution must all be known. Each of these inputs has associated uncertainties which limit the overall 
precision with which the fissile isotopic content can be estimated in an absolute sense. However, for safeguards 
purposes, a measurement made relative to a known startup fuel content may suffice, in which case many of 
these uncertainties are reduced or eliminated. This point is discussed further in 5.3, where experimental results 
from demonstration safeguards reactors are discussed in more detail.  
 
Historically, the total integrated absolute flux of antineutrinos emitted by a thermal reactor has been shown to 
both predictable and measurable to an uncertainty of about 2%
26
. Recent work indicates that the uncertainty in 
the predicted flux can be further reduced to below 1%, based on improvements in the thermal power 
measurement methods available at some reactors, as well as a more comprehensive validation of the precision 
of the burnup simulation codes
24
.  
 
Proprietary simulation tools, which most accurately represent the isotopic evolution of the core, may in 
principle be available for safeguards inspectors, but their use represents an additional practical obstacle in a 
monitoring context. Members of the KamLAND collaboration has demonstrated that the evolution in the 
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antineutrino rate for Japanese PWRs and BWRs can be described with simple four-parameter equations
25
, one 
per reactor type, which reproduce the results of full reactor core evolution simulations to within 1%.  This 
implies that detailed simulations of the fuel burnup may not be needed at each reactor in order to predict the 
antineutrino rate (or spectrum). Assuming this approach is extensible to other reactors, as is likely, it 
considerably simplifies the analysis of antineutrino data in a safeguards context.   
 
4.1.4.1 Statistical considerations for rate-based measurements of operational status, power and 
burnup 
 
The required event rates for rate-based measurements can be approximately estimated according to application. 
For simple determination of operational status on a daily or weekly basis, the change in the number of true 
antineutrino events from the reactor must be several standard deviations above background fluctuations within 
the desired period. This is easily achievable at ~10-100 meter standoff and modest overburden (10-20 mwe), in 
which circumstance detectable antineutrino rates are in the 100-1000 event per day per ton range, and ratios of 
signal to square root of background are ~10-50. This is shown by the prototype detectors described in 5.3. For 
near-field daily or weekly power or burnup monitoring in LWRs, relative to an initial value, enough data must 
be collected so that statistical uncertainty does not dominate the approximately 0.5% change per month in the 
fission rate induced by the burnup effect. This implies a data collection requirement of about 10000 events per 
month, or ~300 events per day. This also gives 1% precision on a relative thermal power estimate within a 
month, dominated by statistics. For absolute measurements of burnup, without reliance of operator declarations, 
the full antineutrino energy spectrum must be acquired, and the statistical requirements are therefore more 
stringent. This case is discussed in the following section. For longer term monitoring, current detectors can also 
achieve the required signal to background ratios in the mid-field, where rates are at the level of events per day 
or month in 100-1000 ton detectors, and backgrounds have been demonstrated to be suppressed to a factor of 
several below these values (see section 6).   
4.1.5 Spectral Measurements 
 
As long as flux alone is used to estimate plutonium inventory, both relative and absolute measurements would 
still require independent knowledge of the reactor thermal power, since it serves as a free parameter that could 
be used to tune the antineutrino rate and mask the burnup effect.  By using the full antineutrino energy 
spectrum, fissile inventories can be independently confirmed, with little or no input from the reactor operator. 
This is a considerable advantage in a safeguards context compared to flux based measurements. However, 
measurement of a spectrum requires a more sophisticated detector and analysis than a simple counting detector. 
The trade-offs inherent in this approach are considered further in section 5.5.  
 
The plot on the left in Figure 6 shows the representative energy spectra per fission of antineutrinos for the two 
most important fissile elements 
239
Pu and 
235
U. The rightmost plot shows same spectra after folding with the 
energy-dependent detection inverse beta cross section of Equation 1. The differences in both the emitted and 
detected spectra are apparent, amounting to 50% or more, especially at higher energies. While the mean emitted 
  
21 
energy is about 1.5 MeV, the mean detected energy is higher, roughly 4 MeV, enhanced by the quadratic energy 
dependence of the inverse beta cross section.  
 
 
Figure 6: Left: The emitted antineutrino spectra from 235U and 239Pu, as emitted by a LEU-fueled Pressurized Water Reactor. Right: the 
same spectra after convolution with the inverse beta decay cross section. Above approximately 3 MeV, the two spectra differ by 50% or 
greater. Only the sum spectrum is measured in an actual detector. 
 
Experimentally measured antineutrino spectra have absolute accuracies of about 2%
26
, with errors dominated by 
uncertainties in the predicted reactor emission spectrum.  
 
The relative contributions to fission of the different isotopes evolve over the course of the reactor cycle. This 
causes a change in the measured spectrum throughout the reactor cycle. A measurement of the energy spectrum 
is therefore sensitive to the evolving fissile isotopic composition of the core. Figure 7 shows the difference in 
the spectrum as simulated at the beginning and end of a representative 600 day LEU-fueled equilibrium LWR 
cycle, and the fractional change in the spectrum over this same cycle as a function of energy.  
 
Figure 7: Left: the antineutrino energy spectrum from a representative LEU-fueled LWR, at beginning of cycle (b.o.c, shown 
in blue) and end of cycle (e.o.c., shown in red). Right: The fractional change in antineutrino rate from beginning of cycle to 
end of cycle, plotted versus energy. 
The bin-to-bin differences between the beginning and end of cycle spectra range from 6-20%, with the most 
pronounced difference being at higher energies. Because these differences are larger than the known 2% 
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uncertainties in the predicted spectra, they can be – and have been - experimentally observed with energy-
resolving antineutrino detectors
16
.  
 
Plutonium and uranium isotopic content and power can be derived from a fit to an integral antineutrino energy 
spectrum, taking the unknown fissions fractions i and the thermal power W as free parameters. Huber et. al.
27
  
have shown that the Pu content in an equilibrium cycle of an LWR can be estimated to within 10%, or about 40 
kg of Pu (
239
Pu+
241
Pu), by measuring the antineutrino spectrum with 10
6 
events, assuming current 2% 
uncertainties in the antineutrino energy spectra, and a 0.6% uncertainty in detector response. A three-fold 
reduction in the spectral uncertainties would lead to a 20 kg estimate of total fissile Pu content.  This method 
requires no prior assumptions about reactor power or the fission fractions. A further refinement is to constrain 
the fit by a direct comparison throughout the cycle with the expected spectra based on a detailed simulation of 
the reactor core evolution.   
 
Improvements on this estimate of the plutonium inventory can be expected for two reasons. First, next-
generation neutrino oscillation experiments such as Double Chooz, described in 8.1.1, will directly measure the 
antineutrino spectrum from a PWR, with an expected factor of two improvement in precision. Improved beta 
spectrometry measurements for fission daughters will also help improve the precision of the predicted 
antineutrino spectra. Perhaps more importantly, as already discussed in the context of rate measurements, 
safeguards regimes do not necessarily require an absolute estimate of the fissile inventory: instead a 
measurement may suffice of changes relative to a known inventory at beginning of cycle. For example, power 
and burnup information can be derived from declarations or other measurements, or an initial single cycle 
calibration period can be used to empirically correlate a known and measured plutonium inventory with the 
antineutrino spectrum (or rate) for the particular reactor in question in later cycles. Cycle-to-cycle consistency 
of this measurement would demonstrate that the reactor is operating according to declarations, without being 
affected by many of the systematic uncertainties in the emitted antineutrino flux. Such an approach would also 
eliminate many systematic effects imposed by the antineutrino detector. This relative analysis has been explored 
by the Rovno and SONGS1 experiment, and is discussed below in section 5.3. The approach is analogous to 
that adopted in some modern neutrino oscillation experiments such as Double Chooz
28
, wherein the ratio is 
formed of the antineutrino spectra and rates as measured in two identical detectors at different standoff, in order 
to isolate the oscillation phenomenon and remove many reactor and detector related systematic effects. The 
difference in the current case is that this ratio is being formed using the same detector at different times during 
the cycle, rather than using two different detectors. For such relative measurements, the time stability of the 
detector response is therefore a key experimental criterion.  
4.1.5.1 Statistical considerations for absolute spectral measurements of fissile content and power  
 
Summarizing results discussed above and derived in reference [27], about 100,000 events acquired over a 
several month period would be required in to achieve a 3% accurate absolute power measurement using a 
spectral analysis, assuming current spectral uncertainties. Approximately 10
^6
 events in a several month period 
would allow extraction of an estimate of the mass of the main fissile isotopes at an accuracy of 10% with 
existing spectral uncertainties, or 1-2% accuracy if these uncertainties can be reduced by a factor of 3-10.  
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4.1.6 Directionality 
 
Directional information about antineutrinos is difficult to obtain. Using the inverse beta decay interaction, the 
Chooz collaboration has successfully reconstructed the direction of antineutrinos from a known reactor source 
with a pointing accuracy of approximately 20 degrees
14
. However, because the stochastic relation between the 
antineutrino direction and the measured quantities in this detector, thousands of events were required to achieve 
this pointing accuracy. This number of events is incompatible with the low event rates required for discovery of 
small reactors in mid-field and far-field applications. (1-500 km standoff distances). New methods of event-by-
event reconstruction of the antineutrino direction are a key area of interest for long range applications.  
Directional information can also be extracted from detectors that rely on Cerenkov light detection, such as the 
Super-Kamiokande detector
29
. The incident antineutrino direction is recovered by determining the apex and 
central angle of the reconstructed Cerenkov light cone. However, such detectors rely on antineutrino-electron 
scattering, which, as already discussed, is less suitable for security applications because of the smaller cross-
section. This method also requires high statistics in order to reconstruct the source direction in an average sense.  
4.2 Production of Antineutrinos in Fission Explosions 
 
The burst of antineutrinos arising from a fission explosion arises from the same source as reactor antineutrinos:  
the chain of approximately six beta-decays that follow each fission. An unclassified picture of the antineutrino 
burst can be created using a few simple assumptions. First, unlike steady state reactors, all the fissions in the 
explosion are taken to occur within 1-10 microseconds. This must be true since criticality is maintained over 
time scales only of this order. For the same reason, the fissioning neutrons physically cannot have thermalized 
prior to the rapid disassembly (read explosion) of the weapon. Therefore, the population of fission daughters, 
and the antineutrino energies are both characteristic of those produced by fast neutron fission.  These two facts 
suffice to crudely define the important features of the burst: its number, energy and time distributions.   
 The total number of antineutrinos in the burst is directly proportional to the explosive yield.  
6) YN6N fiss  
with 
Y(kt)    yield  
Nfiss = 1.45  10
23
  number of fissions/kt 
 
The antineutrino energy distribution is created by a fast neutron fission spectrum. Such a spectrum has been 
calculated theoretically by Vogel
10
, (though not yet measured at a reactor or in an explosion).   Figure 8 shows 
the energy distribution of the antineutrinos emitted by a fission explosion, which in this simple approximation is 
essentially that expected from a fast reactor. 
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Figure 8: The approximate energy spectrum of antineutrinos produced in a U-235 fission explosion. 
 
The time distribution of the antineutrino burst is set by the half-lives of the fission products. These peak at 
relatively short times, ranging from a few milliseconds to a few seconds, with a long tail extending out to very 
long half-lives. Figure 9 shows an approximate time distribution of the events, based on the lifetimes of the 
known most probable fission daughters. The mean lifetime is about 2.5 seconds. 
 
Figure 9: The approximate time distribution of the antineutrinos produced in a 
235
U fission explosion. 
 
4.2.1 Detection of Antineutrinos from Fission Explosions  
 
Summarizing the signal of interest, a detector must be capable of registering antineutrino events with energies 
up to about 8 MeV from a burst lasting a few seconds.  
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Accounting for energy threshold, the number of events in an inverse beta detector as a function of yield Y, 
distance D and detector mass M is given by: 
7) 
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Unfortunately this is a dauntingly small number. Equation 7 reveals that only about 2 events would be detected 
in million ton detector at 100 kilometer standoff.   
While the number of events is quite small, their burst-like nature is very effective for reducing backgrounds. 
However, as a result of this ‗antineutrino-starved‘ circumstance, only detection is possible, and that, clearly 
only with enormous effort: no spectral (or temporal) distributions are likely to be measurable in any realistic 
scenario. In Section 7.5 we discuss the prospects and possible benefits of remote nuclear explosion monitoring 
with antineutrinos.  
5 Near-Field Applications: Safeguards and Cooperative Monitoring  
 
In this section we describe the goals and currently used protocols and technologies of the IAEA reactor 
safeguards regime in some detail, and then define possible roles that antineutrino detection may play in this 
regime. We also discuss the many historical examples of deployed antineutrino detectors. These deployments - 
including two that have been built for the purpose of testing and demonstrating cooperative reactor monitoring - 
provide valuable information on cost, intrusiveness, and ease of operation. Because of the historically limited 
budget of the IAEA, these practical considerations are decisive when considering adoption of the technology 
within the IAEA safeguards regime. Next, we discuss other operational concepts for cooperative monitoring 
beyond safeguards, and conclude this section with a discussion of the R&D needs for future antineutrino-based 
near-field monitoring applications.  
5.1 Current Reactor Safeguards Methods  
 
The objective of the IAEA safeguards regime is ―… timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of 
nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons...‖30 The regime applies 
to all civil nuclear infrastructure, including commercial and research reactors. Since antineutrinos are produced 
in practically measurable numbers only by critical or supercritical systems, reactors are the only part of the 
IAEA safeguards regime for which antineutrino detection is potentially relevant.  
 
‗Timely detection‘ and ‗significant quantity‘ are essential elements of the IAEA safeguards regime. Both have 
formal definitions. Table 2 shows the IAEA timely detection goals. These goals are based on the ‗conversion 
time‘, an estimate of the time needed to convert nuclear material of a given form into a weapon. A significant 
quantity (SQ) is defined as the amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear 
explosive device cannot be excluded. Table 3 shows the IAEA definition of a significant quantity.  
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IAEA Timeliness goal  Material form  
One month unirradiated direct use material (e.g., Highly Enriched 
Uranium (HEU) (=> 20% uranium, enriched in 
235
U), 
separated plutonium, or Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel) 
Three months 
 
irradiated direct use material, (e.g., plutonium (Pu) in 
spent or core fuel) 
One year indirect use material (e.g., Low Enriched Uranium 
(LEU) (< 20% uranium, enriched in 
235
U) or natural 
uranium) 
Table 2: IAEA timeliness goals for detection of diversion of nuclear material from reactors
2
. 
 
IAEA Significant Quantity Isotopic content 
25 kg of 
235
U in HEU HEU is defined as uranium with ≥ 20% 235U 
content 
75 kg of 
235
U in LEU LEU is defined as uranium with < 20% 
235
U 
content 
8 kg of elemental Pu Any isotopic mix of Pu except Pu with >20% 
238
Pu 
Table 3: IAEA definitions for Significant Quantities of nuclear material. 
 
IAEA safeguards methods divide into two categories: 
 
1. Nuclear material accountancy: counting, examination, and direct measurements which verify the 
quantities and continued integrity of declared nuclear materials.  
2. Containment and surveillance (C/S) measures: C/S measures, such as video, tags and seals, and similar 
methods, are used to complement material accountancy methods.  
 
Reactor safeguards activities vary according to reactor type, while possessing certain common features. At all 
reactors, safeguards begin with a Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ), provided by the State to the IAEA. 
The IAEA conducts an initial review and site inspection based on the DIQ information. The review consists of a 
comparison of the plant design documentation with the actual plant infrastructure relevant for safeguards.  
Throughout the lifetime of the reactor, the IAEA annually verifies the DIQ, in particular when the State reports 
any changes to reactor operations.   
 
Once the reactor is online, the safeguards regime applies material accountancy and C/S measures to fresh fuel, 
in-core fuel and spent fuel. The essential accounting methods are audits of plant operating records, in which the 
records are checked for consistency and compared with earlier reports to IAEA. 
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The IAEA verifies that fresh fuel shipped from a fabrication facility is identical to that received at the reactor, 
by comparing serial numbers on received fresh fuel against records of fuel shipments from the fuel fabrication 
facility. A similar procedure is applied for all materials shipped from the site. Shipments of spent fuel are 
closely scrutinized: extra inspection trips are used if necessary to verify the fuel integrity and check serial 
numbers of casks of spent fuel being shipped offsite or to onsite dry storage. 
Beyond these common features, accountancy and C/S measures vary with reactor type, as we now describe.  
5.1.1 LWR safeguards  
 
LWRs are distinguished by their fuel enrichment (typically LEU, 3-5% enriched) and by the property of off-line 
refueling. These factors mainly determine the IAEA safeguards protocols particular to LWRs. Off-line refueling 
means that the fissile material in the reactor is accessible only in reactor-off periods. These reactor outages are 
therefore the focus of much of IAEA verification activities at LWRs.  
For fresh in-core and spent fuel, IAEA must verify every three months that no diversions of a SQ of Pu in core 
fuel and spent fuel have occurred, and must verify every year that no diversions of a SQ of LEU in fresh fuel, 
core or spent fuel have occurred. The IAEA conducts Interim Inventory Verification (IIV) inspections at three 
month intervals to meet its Pu timeliness goal, and conducts a Physical Inventory Verification (PIV) at LWRs 
once per year to meet its LEU timeliness goal. During the PIV, the IAEA verifies the presence of all nuclear 
materials onsite, and all shipments of nuclear material into and out of the site. Other inspections may occur 
during the year to verify movements of spent fuel to on-site wet or dry storage.  
 
5.1.1.1 Declarations of thermal power  
As part of the inspection process, the IAEA receives from the State an official declaration of the total thermal 
power generated by the plant since the last inspection period. The IAEA uses the power history of the reactor to 
analyze Pu production in the core. Although reactor power monitoring systems are available, and used in other 
reactor safeguards regimes (such as at research reactors, see below) these systems have not been implemented at 
LWRs they have been found to be intrusive and difficult to maintain, with large cost and little benefit compared 
to C/S techniques
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. Because of this expense and difficulty, the IAEA has no direct independent confirmation of 
the Pu ingrowth in the core beyond the internal consistency of the operator declarations.  
5.1.1.2 Fresh fuel and in-core fuel verification 
 
During the Physical Inventory Verification, the IAEA verifies the continued presence of fuel in the core by 
using an underwater camera to check serial numbers on fuel assemblies. The IAEA also counts the number of 
fresh fuel items, verifies their serial numbers, and randomly verifies a number of fuel assemblies to confirm that 
they contain uranium, using an approved statistical sampling plan. A gamma spectrum is measured, within 
which the 185 keV peak of 
235
U is identified, in order to verify the uranium content of the fuel. Once the reactor 
core is verified the IAEA depends on containment and surveillance (C/S), using a prescribed combination of 
seals on strategic hatches and canals in the reactor pool and surveillance cameras, to reassure that no tampering 
with the core fuel occurs until the next PIV.   
5.1.1.3 Spent fuel verification 
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The IAEA also verifies and maintains Continuity of Knowledge (CofK) of spent fuel at LWRs, Spent fuel is the 
most attractive material from a proliferation standpoint since it contains the most Pu, is outside of the reactor 
and thus more susceptible to diversion.  During each Physical Inventory Verification visit, the IAEA verifies the 
continued presence of spent fuel in the cooling pond using a night vision device tuned to the Cerenkov light 
spectrum emitted by the spent fuel. For old and/or low burn-up fuel with reduced Cerenkov output, the presence 
of spent fuel items is verified by spectroscopic detectors which detect the 662 keV gamma ray line from 
137
Cs.  
Once the spent fuel pool is verified, the IAEA maintains CofK with surveillance cameras, and in some cases by 
sealing the cover plates over the spent fuel pond.  
 
Every three months the IAEA verifies the spent fuel for timeliness by verifying the functionality and integrity of 
surveillance equipment and seals.  If no C/S system exists at the spent fuel pond, the IAEA must reverify the 
entire spent fuel pond every three months using Cerenkov or gamma-ray detectors.  
 
5.1.2 CANDU Safeguards  
 
At CANDUs, the main focus of safeguards is on accountability for spent fuel.  As in LWRs, accounting records 
are audited during each visit and compared with past reports to IAEA. In addition, CANDUs are subjected to 
the following safeguards measures:  
 
Verification of fuel in the core by continuously monitoring spent fuel discharges using a Core Discharge 
Monitor; 
Counting and monitoring of spent fuel bundles as they are transferred from the vault to the spent fuel bay using 
Spent Fuel Bundle Counters.  Where required, other vault penetrations are monitored to verify that all spent fuel 
is transferred to the spent fuel bay via the route containing the bundle counter;  
Surveillance in the spent fuel bay.  In addition, at some stations tamper-indicating containers of fuel are closed 
with AECL Random Coil seals as a complement to the surveillance system.  At other stations, non-destructive 
assay instruments are used as a back-up for the surveillance system.  
 
Since re-fueling of a CANDU occurs almost daily, permanently installed instrumentation is used to 
continuously monitor and track spent fuel movements.  In contrast, because LWR cores are not usually opened 
more than once per year it is usually possible to apply IAEA safeguards seals to verify that the reactor pressure 
head remains closed between IAEA inspections. 
 
5.1.3 Research Reactor Safeguards 
 
Safeguards practices at research reactors varies considerably because of the  diversity of core types and 
operational characteristics. Audits and C/S measures are pursued in a manner broadly similar to CANDUs and 
LWRs. However, a significant difference in some research reactor safeguards protocols is the use of Reactor 
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Power Monitor (REPM), which monitors neutron levels, and the Advanced Thermo-hydraulic Power 
Monitoring (ATPM) which measures the flow and temperature differential on the primary coolant loop to verify 
core thermal performance. Since fuel in research reactors can be shuffled easily and targets positioned without 
any IAEA knowledge, there is potential in large (>25 MWth) research reactors of unreported Pu production. 
This led to the creation and use of the REPM and ATPM.  ATPM systems must be introduced into the coolant 
loop in the reactor in order to function.  
 
5.2 Antineutrino-Based Reactor Safeguards Methods  
 
The protocols just described rely in large part on C/S measures and on so-called ‗item accountancy‘, which in 
this context refers to the counting of fuel assemblies or fuel rods. By contrast, antineutrino detection is a type of  
‗bulk accountancy‘ method for directly estimating the amounts and rates of consumption and production of 
fissile material in the reactor core, in a manner that is nonintrusive to reactor operations, outside of containment, 
and under control of the safeguards inspectorate. These features provide a complementary set of capabilities that 
can further enhance the reactor safeguards regime.  
As discussed earlier in section 4.1.5 and shown in the examples introduced below, the current state of the art in 
antineutrino detection is such that the measurement, when used alone and independent of any other safeguards 
measure, is sensitive at the one sigma level to changes of roughly 50 kg or 6 significant quantities of Pu and  
300 kg or 4 significant quantities of 
235
U in LEU in reactor fuel, within the IAEA timeliness criterion 
(respectively 3 months and 1 year) set for these materials. These values can be expected to be improved upon by 
further development of antineutrino detectors and data analysis methods. Moreover, antineutrino-based 
safeguards methods are not intended be used alone, but in conjunction with other safeguards measures, 
improving IAEA‘s overall ability for timely detection of significant quantities of fuel, possibly reducing the 
number of inspector days at the site, and providing information that is completely controlled by the inspection 
agency. For example, a fault-tree-based analysis of one diversion scenario, has shown that an independent 
antineutrino-based measurement of the reactor thermal power can provide a three-fold improvement in ability to 
detect diversion of fuel compared to a regime without such a measurement
32
. The complementary, non-intrusive 
nature of antineutrino-based methods, as well as the robustness and ease of use of the underlying detectors, 
point to its strong potential as a new safeguards tool.  
The antineutrino rate and spectral measurements described earlier can be used to extract information about the 
operational status, thermal power and fissile inventory of reactors. The following examples are suggestive but 
not exhaustive of how this information would be used in a safeguards context. In practice, each reactor type – 
LWR, fast reactors, CANDUs, and others – will require a specific safeguards analysis to establish the utility of 
antineutrino detectors within a particular safeguards protocol.  
 
Operational status  
One purpose of tracking the reactor power is to ensure that the reactor was not stopped and started with unusual 
frequency, or otherwise operated in a suspicious manner. For example, frequent shutdowns early in the fuel 
cycle could be indicative of attempts to recover low-burnup fuel, from which plutonium would be easier to 
recover. (The isotopics of such low burnup plutonium are also somewhat more favorable for bomb design.) This 
points to one possible benefit from antineutrino measurements: they can continuously and independently 
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confirm the correctness of operator declarations of the reactor operating history between inspection periods. 
This type of measurement is of particular interest for off-line refueling reactors, such as LWRs or many 
research reactors. For example, the SONGS1 prototype, deployed at an LWR, has shown that shutdowns can be 
discovered within five hours, and that a 20% change in the thermal power can be seen within about 15 -20 hours.  
 
Power  
IAEA does not itself currently use power monitoring technologies at power reactors because of the 
intrusiveness and cost of these systems. Instead, the agency relies on the reactor operators‘ formal declarations 
of power throughout the fuel cycle to estimate core fissile inventories at the end of cycle. By contrast, 
antineutrino rate and spectral measurements offer a means for the IAEA to independently check operator power 
declarations. As described in section 4.1.4, antineutrino rate measurements provide a non-intrusive, real-time 
estimate of instantaneous and integrated thermal power, folded with a correction term that explicitly depends on 
the burnup. As shown below for the SONGS1 experiment, the precision on a relative measurement of thermal 
power - that is, relative to an power measurement initially verified by other means – has been demonstrated at 
the 3% level with a simple detector, limited only by counting statistics and after correcting for the predictable 
effect of burnup. Additional improvement on the precision of the relative power measurement, approaching the 
1-2% level, could be obtained with larger or more efficient detectors than the prototypes so far deployed.   
 
Isotopic content  
Estimates of the isotopic content of in-core fuel are directly accessible in real-time through measurement of 
either the antineutrino rate or energy spectrum. This allows a more stringent consistency check to be enforced 
on operator declarations: the declared burnup of both fresh fuel and spent fuel must be reconciled with the 
estimate of isotopic content provided by the antineutrino rate or spectral measurement. As discussed in section 
4.1.4, rate-based measurements require knowledge of the reactor power and initial fuel loading, while 
measurement of an energy spectrum would allow absolute and independent estimates to be made of both power 
and burnup at few percent level, without additional input about reactor operational parameters. This requires a 
more sophisticated detector and analysis compared to a simple rate measurement. Alternatively, rate-based 
measurements could be used in conjunction with other safeguards measurements to more rigorously constrain 
the fissile content, approaching the significant quantity level.   
5.3 Antineutrino Detector Deployments Relevant for Reactor Safeguards 
 
As seen in Table 4, a large number of experiments have successfully measured antineutrino events near nuclear 
reactors.  This rich experimental history was inaugurated with the discovery of the antineutrino interaction at 
the Savannah River Site in the 1950s
33
, using the same organic scintillator technology that has become the 
standard for reactor antineutrino experiments.  
 
Experiment Power (GW) mass(ton) Distance (m) Depth (mwe) Detector -rate(s
-1
) Deadtime (%) 
ILL34 0.057 0.32 8.76 7 
3
He scint. PSD 250 8 
Gosgen
16
 2.8 0.32 38/46/65 9 
3
He scint. PSD 260-340 8 
Krasnoyarsk35 1.6 0.46 57/231 600 
3
He only - - 
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Bugey 3 36
,37 2.8 1.67 15/40/95 23/15/23 6Li scint. PSD - 2 
SavannahRiver38 2.2 0.25 18.2/23.8 ~10 Gd scint. PSD - - 
CHOOZ
7
 4.4 5 1000 300 Gd scint. 1 2 
Palo Verde
6
 11.6 11.3 800 32 Gd scint. 2000 2 
KamLAND
8
 ~80 408 ~180,000 2700 Gd scint. 0.3 11 
Rovno39 1.4 0.43 18  Gd scint 350 7 
SONGS11919,,40
,41 3.4 0.64 24.5 10 Gd scint. 600 10 
Table 4  The characteristics of several previous reactor antineutrino detection experiments.  The detector column includes the 
technique used, along with whether or not there was Pulse Shape Discrimination (PSD) in the electronics.  
 
Following the discovery of the antineutrino, and as discussed further in section 8.1, most of these experiments 
were built to search for evidence of neutrino oscillations, which appear as a regular, repeated deviation of the 
antineutrino flux from inverse square behavior, as a function of distance. Since there was little theoretical 
guidance on the oscillation spatial frequency, experiments were done at a range of different distances, as seen in 
Figure 5. The large number of experiments has provided a solid foundation of theory and experiment which can 
be applied to safeguards applications. Perhaps most important for near-field applications, the experiments have 
shown that oscillations do not affect the spectrum or inverse square behavior of the antineutrino flux out to 
approximately 1 km. This non-deviation is measured with the absolute precision on the reactor antineutrino flux 
and spectra of the various experiments to the level of 2%. Experiments now being built, such as Double Chooz
28
 
and Daya Bay
42
, will improve the precision of flux and spectral measurements at these distance ranges. 
Additionally, the effect of isotopics on the antineutrino rate and spectrum has been clearly demonstrated by 
many of the earlier experiments. In some experiments, such as the first Chooz deployment
14,
 the direction of the 
antineutrino has been successfully reconstructed.    
Results from many of the oscillation experiments have provided valuable information for the design of detectors 
for non-proliferation purposes.  For example, experience with changes in the optical properties of scintillator in 
CHOOZ and Palo Verde point out the importance of careful handling of the scintillator during production to 
minimize any contaminants which might cause the Gd to come out of solution. This experience has resulted in 
more stable operations and modified scintillator handling procedures that benefit safeguards deployments. A 
wide range of calibration methods, degrees of overburdens, and active and passive shielding methods have been 
studied in these experiments, lating the groundwork for applications.   
Beyond the oscillation experiments, The Russian deployment at the Rovno complex in Ukraine
2
 and the U.S. 
deployment at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station in Southern California
19
 were deployed explicitly to 
demonstrate the feasibility of practical monitoring of reactors in a safeguards context with relatively small 
(cubic meter scale) antineutrino detectors.   
5.3.1 Deployment Considerations  
 
The overall goals for antineutrino detection for safeguards fall into two conflicting categories. First, the 
detectors must be designed, deployed and used to optimally extract measurements relevant for safeguards. 
These will consist of one or more of the operational status, thermal power and isotopic content measurements 
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described earlier, using either rate or spectral information (or both). Second, the detectors must meet additional 
criteria that are generally not a priority in physics deployments, and which may conflict with physics goals. 
These criteria are imposed by IAEA needs for low cost, robust, reliable, easy-to-use, and largely unattended 
monitoring systems, and by the strong desire of reactor operators for minimal impact on plant systems and 
minimal disruption of plant activities.  
In the first category fall basic detector design criteria including standoff distance, the detector target mass and 
local gamma/neutron shielding, the amount of overburden, the need for active muon background rejection, the 
stability in time of the detector response, and the precision with which the detector can be calibrated. The 
second set of criteria include practical considerations such as reducing the detector footprint to the extent 
possible, minimizing energy consumption and replacement of parts, construction from non-hazardous and low 
cost materials, and ability to operate with minimal or no overburden.  As with many applied physics efforts, the 
tension between these practical concerns and the physics requirements for extraction of a reliable signal are the 
focus of current R&D.  
The state of the art is that both the Rovno and SONGS deployments have successfully demonstrated that 
antineutrino detectors at shallow depths and with 2-3 meter linear dimensions (including shielding materials) 
can stably track operational status, thermal power and fissile content in real time in LWRs over the course of 
several years. We next describe the two experiments and summarize the significance of their results for 
safeguards applications. 
5.3.2 Rovno  
 
Russian physicists appear to have been first worldwide to recognize and exploit antineutrino detection as a tool 
for reactor monitoring
43
.  Multiple basic and applied experiments were conducted over the course of many 
years, beginning in 1982, at the Rovno Atomic Energy Station in Kuznetsovsk, Ukraine. The work summarized 
here is from an experimental deployment that focused specifically on measurements relevant for safeguards 
applications
2
.  
The detector consisted of 1050 liters of Gd-doped organic liquid scintillator, viewed through light guides by 84 
photomultiplier tubes. A 510 liter central volume was used as the primary target, with a 540 liter surrounding 
volume, separated by a light reflecting surface, employed as shield against external gammas, and as a capture 
volume for gamma-rays emitted respectively by the positron annihilation and neutron capture. The deployed 
location of the detector was 18 meters vertically below the reactor core, providing substantial overburden for 
screening of muons. An active muon rejection system was apparently not used in this deployment.  
The antineutrino source was a Russian VVER-440 pressurized water reactor, loaded with LEU fuel, with a 
nominal power of 440 MWt. The gross average daily antineutrino-like event rate was 909  6 per day, with a 
reactor-off background rate of 1494 events per day (i.e. a net antineutrino rate of about 7607 per day). The 
intrinsic efficiency of the Rovno detector was approximately 30%. 
The Rovno deployment clearly demonstrated sensitivity to both the power and the isotopic content of the core, 
based on rate and spectral measurements. Figure 10 reveals the expected variation in the antineutrino count rate 
due to the burnup effect. The 5-6% change in rate is well matched to a prediction based on a model of the fuel 
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isotopic evolution in the core, combined with the theoretically predicted antineutrino emission spectra for each 
isotope.  
Figure 10: The antineutrino rate N, normalized to the time average of the rate over the course of the cycle, plotted versus 
effective cycle day, for the Rovno experiment
44
. The points with error bars are the data, the curve is a prediction based on a 
simulation of the reactor core evolution. 
The absolute precision on the reconstructed thermal power of the reactor is 2%, with the largest uncertainties 
arising from imperfect knowledge of the detection efficiency and detector volume. For comparison, direct 
thermal power measurements by the most accurate methods used by reactor operators range have precision 
ranging from 0.5-1.5%  depending on the method. 
The change in the antineutrino spectrum over the course of the fuel cycle is also visible in the Rovno data. 
Figure 11 shows the ratio of the reconstructed antineutrino energy spectra at the beginning and end of the fuel 
cycle. The variation in spectra is most pronounced at the highest energies, consistent with predictions, and is 
caused by the net consumption of 521 kg of fissile material (both plutonium and uranium) over the course of the 
fuel cycle. While not directly quoting an uncertainty on this value derived from the antineutrino measurement, 
the Rovno group independently estimated fuel consumption from the reactor‘s thermal power records, and find 
a value of 52514 kg, close to the antineutrino derived value.  
 
 
Figure 11: The ratio of beginning-of-cycle to end-of-cycle antineutrino spectra, as measured at the Rovno reactor. The points 
with error bars are the data, the curve is a prediction based on a simulation of the reactor core evolution.  
5.3.3 San Onofre 
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The SONGS deployments in the United States were performed independently of the earlier Russian 
experiments, for the express purpose of demonstrating the feasibility of antineutrino detection in the context of 
IAEA safeguards. In a report following a 2003 experts meeting at IAEA headquarters in Vienna
45
, the IAEA 
requested study of the feasibility of ―confirmation of the absence of unrecorded production of fissile material in 
declared reactors‖ with antineutrino detectors, and further stated:  
 
―The appropriate starting point for this scenario is a representative PWR. For this reactor type, simulations of the 
evolution of the antineutrino flux and spectrum over time should be provided, and the required precision of the 
antineutrino detector and independent power measurements should be estimated. This effort should be coupled with 
the already ongoing prototype detector development.‖ 
 
The SONGS1 detector responded to this request, and sought to demonstrate that antineutrino detectors could 
meet other anticipated IAEA requirements. In addition to simulating the antineutrino signal and confirming its 
sensitivity to thermal power and fissile content, the SONGS detector demonstrated stable long-term unattended 
operation, using a simple, low channel count detector design, non-intrusiveness to reactor site operations at a 
commercial power plant for several years, and remote and automatic collection of antineutrino data and detector 
state of health information.   
 
The SONGS1 detector at the San Onofre Unit 2 Nuclear Reactor has been operating since 2002, with the full 
detector volume operational continuously from 2006 through summer 2008.  SONGS1 has an approximately 
cubic meter central target , containing 0.64 tons of gadolinium (Gd) loaded liquid scintillator contained in four 
stainless steel cells, each read by two Photomultiplier Tubes (PMTs). As seen in Figure 12, a six-sided 
water/polyethylene shield of average 0.5 meter thickness is used for passive shielding of neutrons and gamma-
rays, and a 5-sided muon detector for tagging and vetoing muon-related backgrounds. A total of 24 PMTs were 
used to read out both the muon veto and main detector.  
 
The detector was deployed in the Unit 2 ‗tendon gallery‘, an annular room that lies directly under the 
containment dome, and which allows access to steel reinforcement cables that extend through the containment 
structure. The gallery is 25 meters from reactor core center. Many commercial reactors have tendon galleries. 
They are well suited for deployment of an antineutrino detector because the large, vacant space is rarely 
accessed by plant personnel, and because of the muon-screening effect of approximate 10 mwe earth and 
concrete overburden. (The SONGS overburden is 10 mwe – other sites may differ but are of the same depth 
scale .)  At the SONGS location, background muon rates are reduced by a factor of approximately 5 compared 
to above-ground backgrounds.   
 
 
  
35 
 
Figure 12: A cut away diagram of the SONGS1 detector, showing the scale and major subsystems. 
 
The measured antineutrino rate (signal plus background) in the SONGS detector , which has roughly 60% of the 
mass of the ROVNO detector, was 564  13 events per day at full reactor power, with a measured background 
rate of 105  9 events per day at zero reactor power. The intrinsic efficiency of the SONGS detector is 
approximately 10%. 
 
SONGS1 demonstrated sensitivity to the three antineutrino-based safeguards metrics introduced in section 5.2: 
operational status, power and fissile content.  
 
Figure 13 shows a short-term excursion of the reactor power as reflected in the antineutrino rate. The upper plot 
is the hourly antineutrino count rate plotted versus hour. As described in detail in [40], a cumulative statistical 
test statistic, known as the Sequential Probabilistic Ratio Test, is used to determine to a desired level of 
confidence the operational status of the reactor. The evolution of this statistic is shown in the lower plot. In this 
example, confirmation of a change in the reactor operational status is determined within 4 hours.  
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Figure 13: (a): the hourly number of antineutrino-like events, plotted versus hour, through a reactor outage. (b): the value of 
the test statistic plotted versus hour over the same time range. In both plots, the vertical line indicates the hour in which the 
reactor shutdown occurred. The dashed lines in (b) are the 99% confidence level values of the test statistic, known as the 
Sequential Probabilistic Ratio Test. For this data set, these values are obtained only during the appropriate period (on or off), 
meaning that no false positives or negatives occurred. 
 
Figure 14 is a histogram of the weekly antineutrino rate, normalized to average weekly rate for the prior 4 
weeks. This metric provides a relative estimate of the reactor power on a weekly basis, accurate to 3%.  This 
limitation is imposed only by the counting statistics for data accumulated over a week. Further precision can be 
obtained with a larger or more efficient detector.  
 
 
Figure 14: Histogram of the weekly detected antineutrino rate divided by the average of this quantity for the prior four weeks. 
This relative metric gives a 3% accurate measurement  of the reactor thermal power, limited only by counting statistics.   
 
Figure 15 shows the long term change in the antineutrino rate measured in SONGS1 over the course of a full 
reactor cycle. The total change in the antineutrino rate is approximately 12% over the entire cycle, and this 
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change is predicted by a detailed simulation of the core isotopic evolution. The measured change in rate can be 
used to roughly estimate the sensitivity to changes in fissile content. In a SONGS refueling outage, 
approximately 250 kg of 
239
Pu and 
241
Pu is removed and 1500 kg of 
235
U is added in fresh fuel. This leads to the 
measured 12% change in antineutrino rate.  At the one standard deviation level in this prototype, this 
corresponds to the ability to detect a reduction in total Pu content of 40 kg and a simultaneous increase of 
235
U 
content of about 250 kg, using only the antineutrino rate. Further improvement in this sensitivity can be 
expected from a higher statistics measurement (increased detector size or efficiency) or through spectral 
analysis.  
 
Figure 15: The daily background subtracted antineutrino rate over a 600 day cycle of the SONGS Unit 2 reactor.  Data from 
two successive cycles were combined to create this plot. The solid line shows the rate change predicted by a simulation of the 
reactor isotopic evolution.  The lower plot shows a measure of the stability of the detector response over this period. The 
response is stable in a relative sense to better than 1% over the entire data-taking period, meaning that the measured rate 
change is not due to changes in the detector response.  
 
In an actual safeguards regime, information derived from the antineutrino detector will be used in conjunction 
with other safeguards methods to determine the absence of diversion of a significant quantity of fissile material. 
To determine the marginal utility added by antineutrino monitoring in this context, it is useful to evaluate how 
the presence or absence of antineutrino rate information affects the ability to detect diversion in specific 
scenarios. One such study
46
 has shown a 3-fold improvement in the probability of detecting diversion at a 
reprocessing plant, when inventory information derived from a SONGS1-style antineutrino detector is used in 
conjunction with other safeguards information, compared to a scenario in which this information is not 
available.  In the example scenario, the antineutrino detector measured a 5% power increase, which resulted in 
the presence of an otherwise unaccounted for significant quantity of plutonium (8 kg), assumed diverted at a 
downstream reprocessing facility.  
 
Beyond the safeguards metrics just described, SONGS1 addressed important practical considerations relevant to 
safeguards deployments. SONGS1 collected and analyzed data continuously, remotely and in real time, using a 
local computer and telephone modem uplink to a laboratory in Northern California. The detector location was 
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completely removed from daily reactor operations, and no maintenance of the detector by site personnel was 
required.  Only occasional detector maintenance was required by LLNL and SNL deployment team, even for 
this non-optimized prototype.  
 
An important shortcoming of many liquid organic scintillators, including the material used in SONGS1, is their 
low flashpoint, high flammability and relatively high toxicity. Though SONGS1 has demonstrated non-intrusive 
and safe operation, the use of the flammable liquid does impose some safety burden on the operator and 
inspector that it is preferable to avoid. A more recent effort at SONGS has demonstrated antineutrino sensitivity 
with a non-toxic plastic scintillator based detector. One of the two identical modules of this detector, SONGS2, 
is depicted in the cutaway rendering in Figure 16. Each module consists of 24 2 cm x 0.75 m x 1m plastic 
scintillator slabs, interleaved with thin Mylar sheets painted with Gd-doped paint. Each module is read by a 
total of 4 PMTs, and is placed in an aluminum framework for portability. The total active volume of this 
detector was 0.4 cubic meters. The plot to the right in Figure 16 shows the gross daily antineutrino count rate 
through a short outage, revealing clear sensitivity to the antineutrino signal. While preliminary, these results 
show a short term monitoring capability similar to that of the SONGS1 liquid scintillator detector. Further 
analysis is needed to demonstrate long term sensitivity to burnup.  
 
 
Figure 16: Left: a cutaway view of the plastic scintillator/Mylar sandwich detector SONGS2. Mylar sheets, covered with a Gd-
doped paint,  are interleaved between the 2 centimeter thick plastic scintillator blocks. Light collection is accomplished with 4 
photomultiplier tubes. Right: initial data from the plastic detector showing sensitivity to the antineutrino signal.  
 
The advantages of this approach are several. Most importantly the flammable, toxic, and carcinogenic liquid 
organic scintillator is eliminated. In addition, the detector can be fully assembled offsite, rather than built in 
place, as is often the case with the liquid detectors. It also can be transported to the site without using resorting 
to the more expensive shipping methods and onerous transport regulations required for hazardous materials. 
The disadvantages are some reduction in overall detection efficiency due to the detector design and the plastic 
scintillator proton density.   
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5.3.4 Beyond Rovno and SONGS: A Demonstration Safeguards Project 
 
The Rovno and SONGS1 deployments both clearly demonstrate many of the expected requirements for 
antineutrino-based safeguards. They show that antineutrino detectors can extract measurements of direct 
safeguards interest for years at a time, without affecting plant infrastructure or interfering with plant personnel 
activities.  The relatively simple design of the detectors, with their low channel counts, readily available raw 
materials, and low maintenance requirement, demonstrates that IAEA criteria for low cost, simple unattended 
remote monitoring capabilities can all be met. While absolute detection of significant quantities of fissile 
material have not yet been achieved with antineutrino detectors alone, initial studies indicate that the additional 
information provided by antineutrino detectors, in conjunction with other safeguards information, can constrain 
fissile content at the few dozen kg level, and improve ability to detect diversion in specific scenarios. In section 
5.5, we discuss additional R&D that would be useful to further improve the utility of antineutrino detectors for 
safeguards.  
A logical next step from these efforts would be a deployment of a detector at an IAEA safeguarded facility in a 
non-nuclear weapons state, preferably with the direct involvement of IAEA. Such a deployment would 
represent an important advance beyond the earlier safeguards demonstrations, by serving as a pilot project and 
an example for IAEA safeguarded reactor facilities worldwide. Valuable information on integration of 
antineutrino detectors into the modern reactor safeguards regime would be gained from such a test deployment.  
5.4 Beyond Safeguards  
 
Aside from the existing IAEA safeguards regime, other existing or future cooperative near-field monitoring 
regimes might benefit from antineutrino detectors. Examples include tracking the progress of plutonium 
disposition in reactors, verifying the cessation of fissile material production at a previously active reactor site 
for the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty or similar regimes, or verifying core conversion in plutonium production 
reactors in weapons states. Here we provide one example of a verification problem beyond safeguards that 
might be addressed with antineutrino detectors.  
‗Plutonium disposition‘ refers to the management of separated weapons-grade plutonium inventories declared 
excess to military needs by the United States and Russia.  As defined in a 1994-1995 National Academy of 
Sciences study
47, an important goal for any plutonium disposition program is to comply with the ‗Spent Fuel 
Standard‘. The Spent Fuel Standard requires that separated surplus military weapons-grade plutonium is 
converted into a physical form from which it is as difficult to recover plutonium as from ordinary commercial 
reactor spent fuel
b
. One proposed way to meet this Standard is to convert the weapons-grade plutonium into 
mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel, where the mixture typically contains 5% Pu and 95% natural or depleted uranium, 
and to irradiate this fuel in a commercial reactor. In this context, antineutrino detectors could be used to verify 
                                                   
 
b
 Briefly, the logic of the Spent Fuel Standard is that converting separated military plutonium stockpiles into a form similar to spent 
fuel, which contains most of the world‘s plutonium, is both necessary and sufficient after consideration of nonproliferation, cost, 
speed, and technical factors. A more resistant form would be too expensive and slow to produce; a less resistant form would be too 
attractive from the standpoint of a proliferator.  (We note that since no significant disposition of plutonium has taken place in the 
one and one half decades since the study was completed, choosing methods based on the estimated time to completion seems less 
important than was previously thought.) 
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that a reactor is actually burning weapons plutonium and not a substitute such as LEU fuel, or other separated 
MOX fuel not derived from weapons material. Figure 17 shows the predicted variation in antineutrino rate for a 
PWR operated with LEU, and with MOX fuel composed of either reactor-grade and weapons-grade plutonium. 
The weapons-grade plutonium used in this simulation contains 94% of the fissile isotope 
239
Pu, and the reactor 
grade plutonium contains 52%  
239
Pu. A detailed simulation of the evolution of the reactor fuel composition was 
used to predict the variation in antineutrino rate
48
. Since the absolute errors on rate are at the 2% level, changes 
between LEU and MOX should be clearly visible in an antineutrino detector, while changes in the isotopic mix 
of plutonium are at the current limit of sensitivity for antineutrino detectors.  
 
Figure 17: The variation in the emitted antineutrino flux from a PWR, according to fuel composition. The abscissa units are 
Gigawatt-Days per Metric Ton of Heavy Metal GWD/MTM or per Metric Ton Uranium (MTU)). The difference between 
LEU-fueled (black) and MOX-fueled (blue and red) cores is evident in the changing antineutrino rate. The distinction between 
weapons-grade (WG) and reactor-grade (RG) fuels may just be visible in high burnup conditions (> 20  GWD/MTM).  The 
plot is from reference 48.  
5.5 R&D Needs For Near-Field Antineutrino Detectors  
 
Several demonstrations have explicitly shown that current generation antineutrino detectors offer new, 
practically achievable capabilities for IAEA reactor safeguards. In this section we will discuss research and 
development paths for improving the effectiveness of antineutrino detectors in near-field applications. R&D 
needs divide into three broad categories: 
 improving the precision with which diversion of significant quantities of fissile material can be detected.  
 improving the ease of deployment and operation of safeguards antineutrino detectors.   
 performing additional systems analyses for IAEA safeguards and other cooperative monitoring 
applications.   
 
These R&D paths are summarized here. 
5.5.1 Increasing Sensitivity to Diversion of Material 
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Since the goal of current IAEA reactor safeguards is to detect diversion of significant quantities of material 
from reactors, an important class of R&D problem relates to improving the precision of estimates of fissile 
inventories derived from antineutrino detectors. (A closely related problem is improving our understanding of 
the synergies between antineutrino-based monitoring and other elements of the safeguards regime, which is 
considered in section 5.5.4.) 
 
Little improvement is required in the precision of measurements of reactor operational status, which alert 
inspectors to unusual operating conditions and constrain the total amount of material that may have been 
generated in a given time period for a known reactor. Existing near-field antineutrino detectors have already 
demonstrated detection of shut-downs or tens of percent changes in reactor power within a few hours. With 
timely response by the inspecting agency, this reaction time is sufficient in the context of IAEA safeguards.  
 
Some enhancement is both necessary and achievable in the precision of thermal power and fuel inventory 
estimates. Relating these quantities to the measured antineutrino rate and spectrum involves three steps, each 
amenable to further improvement.  First the initial fuel loading and the thermal power profile of the reactor are 
used as inputs to predict the evolving fissile content at any time during the reactor cycle. Typically a reactor 
simulation package such as ORIGEN is used for this purpose. Second, the neutrino spectrum per fissile isotope 
is folded with the varying isotopic information. Third, the emitted antineutrino spectrum is related to the 
measured positron spectrum in the antineutrino detector, often by means of a detector response Monte Carlo 
code. Here we provide a discussion of R&D priorities that could lead to improvement in each area.  
5.5.1.1 Predicted isotopic inventories and fission product yields 
 
In the context of verifying declarations, simulations of the predicted evolution of the reactor fissile isotopic 
inventories play an important role. A recent review of the benchmarking of the precision of simulation codes 
has shown that for PWRs and BWRs, isotopics are successfully predicted by ORIGEN and other simulation 
packages with a mean precision below 1%, but a spread in precision across many experiments of several 
percent. This translates into an uncertainty in the predicted antineutrino spectrum of below 1%
24
.  
In this area, there are two main useful R&D paths in the context of safeguards. The first is to develop a 
comprehensive code package that combines all the elements needed for complete simulation of antineutrino 
spectra. Currently, the isotopic evolution simulation packages are normally decoupled from codes that 
reproduce antineutrino spectra. A more comprenhensive and integrated treatment, as outlined and initiated by 
the MCNP Utility for Reactor Evolution (MURE) project
49
, is to build the spectrum on a per-fission basis, 
accounting for each individual fission products contribution to the total spectrum. The second area of need is to 
further extend the simulation base to a wider range of reactors, including CANDUs, fast reactors, and other 
reactor types of interest for safeguards.   
5.5.1.2 Predicted antineutrino spectra 
 
Distinct from the isotopic evolution, the absolute uncertainties in the predicted spectra of antineutrinos emitted 
per fission by each isotope can be further reduced beyond their current 2% level. An analysis by Huber
27
 has 
shown that a three-fold reduction in these uncertainties would result in a 20 kg (2.5 significant quantity) 
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uncertainty on the absolute quantity of fissile plutonium in a PWR as derived from a spectral analysis. In the 
limit, with no uncertainty on the spectra of individual isotopes, the Pu content could be determined to the 
significant quantity level, using only antineutrino information. While the absolute uncertainty in the spectra will 
never be zero, we note that a relative cycle-to-cycle comparison of directly measured antineutrino spectra at a 
given reactor could reduce or even eliminate these systematic effects.  Moreover, antineutrino-derived 
information is likely to be used in conjunction with other data to meet safeguards goals.   
 
One approach to predicting antineutrino spectra is to use electron spectra measured directly from fission. When 
the electron spectrum is suitably binned in energy, the intensity and energy values of each bin - along with the 
known analytic form of the underlying beta spectra - are used to predict the endpoint energies and intensities of 
each beta branch. The individual beta branches are constrained to sum to the original experimentally measured 
electron spectrum
c
.  Once the endpoint energy and intensity of each underlying branch is estimated, this 
information can be analytically converted to an antineutrino spectrum arising from the same fissile isotope. The 
most recent efforts using this approach show a 1% uncertainty in converting electron to antineutrino spectra
50
. 
Needed R&D in this area lies in possible improved analytic or Monte Carlo treatment of the conversion process, 
and improvement in the experimentally measured electron spectra from fission from which the antineutrino 
spectra are derived.  
 
A second approach is to precisely measure individual fission-fragment yields of each isotope, and fold these 
yields with the calculated individual antineutrino spectra, with endpoint energies now derived from electron 
spectra measurements on individual fragments rather than on a per fission basis. The precision of this approach 
could be improved with additional experiments that measure missing electron spectra from short-lived high Q-
value decays.  
 
5.5.2 Improving Safeguards Antineutrino Detector Performance 
 
Current detectors will work for many safeguards applications. Still, further improvements would be useful and 
can be anticipated in the performance of antineutrino detectors for safeguards. With a wide range of possible 
designs available, the central challenge lies in balancing the need for the greatest possible sensitivity with ease 
of deployment and operation. Here we consider key performance requirements, and the R&D paths of greatest 
interest for improving the performance of cooperative monitoring antineutrino detectors. Improved deployment 
characteristics are considered in the following section.  
 
Statistical considerations place the first constraint on detector performance. Several hundred events per day are 
needed for short-term (1-2 hours) shutdown information at commercial PWRs, and to achieve weekly power 
measurements at the few percent level. These capabilities have already been demonstrated by the cubic meter 
scale Rovno and SONGS detectors, at 20-25 meter standoff from few GWt reactors. The same event rates have 
                                                   
 
c
 In this prescription, the number of derived endpoints and intensities is equal to the number of bins. 
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also been shown by both Rovno and SONGS to suffice for detecting the 5-10% per cycle burnup effect in 
PWRs.  
 
Research reactors have powers ranging from a few kW up to a maximum of several hundred MWt. A scaling 
example is instructive to consider the requirements imposed by lower power reactors. For a 100 MWt reactor, a 
3 ton detector with the same efficiency (30%) and standoff (18 meters) as the Rovno detector, would have an 
event rate of over 300 events per day, still sufficient for monitoring short term shutdowns and thermal power to 
the few percent level on a weekly basis. Improvements in detection efficiency, discussed below, may change the 
conclusion, but given the current state of the art, practical detectors probably cannot reach safeguards sensitivity 
goals for reactors much below 100 MWt.  
 
Spectral analysis imposes a more stringent constraint on the required statistics. As already discussed, about 10
6 
total
 
antineutrino events are required for an absolute measurement of fissile Pu inventories accurate to the 10% 
level with no prior assumptions about reactor operating parameters, with current emitted flux uncertainties, and 
with an assumed detector uncertainty on the spectral measurement of 0.6%
27
. This represents about 1300 days 
of running of the cubic meter Rovno detector, too long to be relevant for safeguards, as well as requiring a 
lower uncertainty on detector response than has been achieved to date. To reach this same absolute sensitivity in 
the several month time period consistent with IAEA safeguards needs would require approximately 11,000 
events per day. This level might be reached at SONGS standoff with a 2.75 ton detector with 70% intrinsic 
efficiency, roughly similar to the Chooz detector parameters. Though this detector operated successfully for a 
period of a year or more, and its efficiency substantially exceeds the 10-30% efficiency of the safeguards 
demonstration detectors at SONGS and Rovno, the Chooz installation was significantly more complex and 
expensive than either of the safeguards detectors.  
 
It is important to add that the requirements for a spectral measurement to be initially useful in a safeguards 
context are considerably less stringent than this, if independent constraints on reactor operations are available 
from other parts of the safeguards process.  Indeed, with a spectral analysis combined with knowledge of the 
reactor power output, the Rovno experiment has already shown sensitivity at roughly the few tens of kg level to 
the total amount of fissile material generated in a single cycle, using just 760 net antineutrino events per day. 
This demonstrates that currently available detectors can be used for highly sensitive relative safeguards spectral 
measurements.  
 
To meet the more stringent event rate goals imposed by smaller reactors and by absolute spectral measurements 
at large reactors, increases in event rates could come from the simplest expedient of increasing detector size. 
Reactor operator and IAEA needs for relatively small and non-intrusive detectors clearly limit this most obvious 
approach. However, we note that in future reactor construction, it may be possible to deliberately allocate 
enough space close to the core (but outside of containment) to accommodate multi-ton detectors. A 100 ton 
detector (including shielding) such as Chooz would fit in a cubic footprint 5 meters on a side. This is no larger 
than many stand-alone infrastructure elements already in place at reactor sites, such as water storage tanks.   
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Another way to increase event rates is to improve the intrinsic efficiency of the detector beyond the 30% level 
achieved in a practical detector by the Rovno group. The Chooz intrinsic efficiency of 70% came at the price of 
a large detector (a 5 ton target and a 100 ton shield), needed to fully contain the spatially diffuse gamma shower 
from capture of the neutron on the Gd dopant. Alternatives to Gd-capture are an interesting albeit challenging 
R&D path. For example, alpha emitting neutron capture agents will have a sub-millimeter extent of energy 
deposition following neutron capture, so that the total spatial extent of the antineutrino interaction (including 
displacement of the positron and neutron signals but not the 511 keV positron annihilation gamma-rays) is of 
the order several centimeters. Among other problems, this approach suffers from the fact that high linear energy 
transfer particles such as alphas have reduced light output relative to the Compton electrons created by gamma-
interactions, so that energy thresholds for such detectors would have to be reduced, potentially increasing 
background rates. Nonetheless this is an important area of R&D for safeguards.  
 
Another detector parameter affecting safeguards measurements is the overall systematic uncertainty in detector 
response. In an LEU-fueled PWR, the antineutrino rate changes systematically by about 0.6-1% per month in 
response to an ingrowth in plutonium of roughly 20 kg per month (assuming linear ingrowth for simplicity). An 
absolute detector response systematic uncertainty within a factor of a few of this value should suffice for 
safeguards measurements that meet IAEA timelinesss criteria. The total systematic detector response 
uncertainty in the Chooz experiment in France was 1.5%. Moreover, making use of a relative measurement will 
further reduce several systematic errors, including important detector-related uncertainties such as the 
uncertainty in the number of target protons. The forthcoming Double Chooz experiment has a set a target 
single-detector absolute systematic uncertainty of 0.6%
28
.  
5.5.3 Improving the Ease of Deployment and Operation  
 
The SONGS and Rovno experiments have already demonstrated practical capabilities suitable for near term use 
in a safeguards context. Nonetheless, there are a variety of methods for improving the ease of deployment and 
operation, differing in impact and difficulty. Here we focus on the following areas that we judge to have the 
greatest likely impact for safeguards, ranked in order of difficulty:  
 development of detectors with improved safety and deployment characteristics compared to current 
liquid scintillator.  
 operating detectors at sea-level rather than underground, and   
 shrinking the overall detector footprint including shielding. 
5.5.3.1 Improved safety characteristics 
 
SONGS2, described in section 5.3.3, has already demonstrated short-term monitoring capability using a plastic 
detector with improved safety characteristics suitable for safeguards applications. One area of useful further 
development is to improve the overall efficiency and energy resolution of plastic detectors. For example, it may 
be possible to dope plastic directly with Gd, allowing for homogeneous detectors and likely increasing the 
neutron capture efficiency relative to a sandwich design
51
.  The key breakthrough needed is to maintain a long 
light attenuation length in the plastic scintillator while attaining the 0.1% Gd concentrations of interest for 
neutron capture. Alternative dopants such as Boron might also be considered.  
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Current liquid scintillator options still retain certain physics advantages relative to a sandwich design plastic 
detector like SONGS2. These include better neutron detection efficiency, lower cost per unit volume and long 
attenuations lengths. For this reason, in addition to plastic scintillator development, it is also useful to explore 
non-toxic replacements for the older generation scintillators. Recently, Gd-doped liquid scintillators such as 
52
 
and linear alkyl benzene
53
 with high flashpoints and reduced toxicity have been demonstrated by various 
groups. Their scintillation yield, attenuation lengths and long-term stability all appear suitable for use in 
safeguards applications, and development of safeguards detectors using these scintillators should also be 
pursued.  
5.5.3.2 Above ground deployment 
A more challenging technical problem arises when considering expanded deployment options. Not all reactors 
have underground galleries with sufficient overburden to accommodate an antineutrino detector.  Above ground 
deployment therefore brings obvious advantages compared to previous reactor antineutrino detector 
installations. Detectors can be placed in a wider range of locations, and this freedom will make acceptance of 
the device easier for reactor operators, and can improve access to and control of the detector for safeguards 
inspectors. Further development along this path is both important for, and probably a unique requirement of, 
antineutrino-based cooperative reactor monitoring. 
 
Above-ground detection is a challenge because of the backgrounds induced by cosmic rays.  
The composition of the cosmic ray components at the earths surface (at sea level elevation) is shown in Table 
5
54
.  
 
Total Flux Muons Secondary  
Neutrons 
Electrons Protons, pions 
3x10
-2
 cm
-2
s
-1
 63% 21% 15% <1% 
Table 5: Composition of the cosmic ray background at sea level. From [54].  
For inverse-beta detectors, the correlated event rate at sea-level increases substantially relative to a shallow 
detector. This is due in part to the presence of the strongly interacting hadronic component of the cosmic ray 
flux, which is removed with just a few meters of shielding. Furthermore, even at the relatively shallow 
deployment depths of the SONGS and Rovno experiments, the more penetrating muon fluxes are themselves 
reduced by factors of 5-10 relative to above ground cosmic ray backgrounds. Fundamental physics experiments 
have typically sought the conceptually simplest solution of reducing these backgrounds by burying the detector. 
In a safeguards context, the additional effort at above-ground background rejection, while a significant 
challenge, may be amply repaid by its deployment advantages.  
 
For inverse beta detectors, above ground detection requires developing more sophisticated means for rejecting 
or screening out backgrounds, without inducing unacceptably high detector deadtime. A straightforward scaling 
of only muon rates from the SONGS1 detector 30 mwe depth to sea-level, would result in an unsatisfactory 40-
50% detector deadtime. This scaling does not include the additional hadronic component present at sea -level.  
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The muon-induced veto rate could be reduced by shrinking the overall detector footprint. Since the same active 
detector volume is desired to maintain the signal rate, this implies a reduction in the passive shield. This might 
be possible by using segmentation, pulse shape discrimination, or other methods within the active volume to 
directly reject backgrounds in lieu of shielding. For example, reducing the shielding thickness of the SONGS1 
detector from 0.5 meters to 0.25 meters would keep the sea-level muon trigger rates equal to those of the buried 
detector.  
 
While space does not permit discussion of all approaches, less familiar designs, such as water-Cerenkov 
detectors and coherent scatter detectors, may also enable above-ground detection, by reducing sensitivity to 
backgrounds, or strongly boosting sensitivity to the antineutrino signal.  We refer the reader to 
conferences
55,56,57
 and literature
58,59
 for further discussion.  
5.5.4 Systems Analysis Needs for IAEA Safeguards and Other Applications  
 
Worldwide, most of the research on antineutrino based safeguards is focused on detector development and 
improved understanding of the emitted reactor antineutrino signal. Less common but no less important is the 
analysis of the performance of antineutrino detectors in the context of IAEA safeguards and for other 
applications.  
 
The study of specific diversion scenarios is a common methodological framework for evaluating the 
effectiveness of safeguards techniques. While some work as already begun in this area, especially for PWRs, 
much more study is needed to assess the benefits of antineutrino detectors for all cases of interest to IAEA. 
Performance against CANDUs, breeder reactors, research reactors of various design must be evaluated, as well 
as the effect of combining antineutrino-based metrics with other safeguards information. Understanding of the 
safeguards regime, along with a thorough command of the performance and limitations of antineutrino detectors 
is required for such analyses. Because of the newness of this technology to cooperative monitoring applications, 
antineutrino researchers and IAEA experts must work together to develop a more mature set of analytical tools 
and personnel capable of using these tools. A similar analytical framework is required to examine possible 
additional uses of antineutrino detectors outside of the current IAEA safeguards regime, for applications such as 
plutonium disposition, verification of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, and others. 
5.5.5 Worldwide Efforts To Develop Safeguards Antineutrino Detectors  
 
25 years after the Russsian demonstrations at Rovno, and four years after the first IAEA experts meeting on this 
topic, there are now many efforts underway around the world to explore the potential of antineutrino based 
reactor safeguards. The evolution of these efforts is summarized in the agendas of annual Applied Antineutrino 
Physics (AAP) Workshops
55.56.57
 At present, work is funded by a variety of national agencies acting 
independently, though there is frequent communication between the physicists involved at the AAP meetings. 
We conclude this section by summarizing worldwide activities in this burgeoning field.  
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5.5.5.1 Effort in Russia 
 
As mentioned above, the concept of using antineutrinos to monitor reactor was first proposed by Mikaelyan, 
and the Rovno experiment
2
 was among the first to demonstrate the correlation between the reactor antineutrino 
flux, thermal power, and fuel burnup. Several members of the original Rovno group continue to develop 
antineutrino detection technology, e.g. developing new Gd liquid scintillator using the LAB solvent. They now 
propose to build an improved cubic meter scale detector specifically for reactor safeguards
60
, and to deploy it at 
a reactor in Russia. 
5.5.5.2 Effort in the U.S.A. 
 
A collaboration between the Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and the Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory (LLNL) has been developing antineutrino detectors for reactor safeguards since about 2000. This 
group‘s focus is on demonstrating the feasibility of antineutrino based monitoring to both the physics and 
safeguards communities. This involves developing detectors that are simple to construct, operate, and maintain, 
and that are sufficiently robust and utilize materials suitable for a commercial reactor environment, while 
maintaining a useful sensitivity to reactor operating parameters. 
 
Inspired by the GADZOOKS concept
61
, the LLNL/SNL group is now investigating the use of Gd-doped water 
as an antineutrino detection medium. This method should be largely insensitive to the correlated background 
produced by cosmogenic fast neutrons that recoil from a proton and then capture. A 250 liter tank of purified 
water containing 0.1% Gd by weight was built to test this concept. An above-ground calibration with neutrons 
has clearly demonstrated the required sensitivity to neutrons, and to correlated events
58
. The detector has also 
been deployed in the SONGS tendon gallery. Data analysis in unshielded and passively shielded configurations 
is underway.  
 
The coherent scatter process, described above, also holds promise for reactor monitoring since it has cross-
section several orders of magnitude higher than that for inverse beta decay, which could eventually yield 
significantly smaller monitoring detectors. To explore this process, LLNL/SNL  is currently collaborating with 
the Collar group of the University of Chicago in deploying an ultra-low threshold Ge crystal at SONGS, as well 
as investigating the potential of dual phase argon detectors for coherent scatter detection.
62
 
 
5.5.5.3 Effort in France 
5.5.5.3.1 Double Chooz 
 
The Double Chooz collaboration plans to use the Double Chooz near detector ( about 400 meters from the two 
Chooz reactors, for a precision non-proliferation measurement
28
. The Double Chooz detectors will represent the 
state-of-the-art in antineutrino detection, and will be able to make a benchmark measurement of the antineutrino 
energy spectrum emitted by a commercial PWR. The MURE effort, described earlier, is being led by Double 
Chooz to improve the reactor simulations used to predict reactor fission rates and the measurements of the 
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antineutrino energy spectrum emitted by the important fissioning isotopes. This work is necessary for the 
physics goals of Double Chooz, and will also improve the precision with which the fuel evolution of a reactor 
can be predicted. 
5.5.5.3.2 Nucifer 
 
The Double Chooz near detector design is too complex and costly for widespread safeguards use. Therefore, the 
Double Chooz groups in CEA/Saclay, IN2P3-Subatech, and APC plan to apply the technology developed for 
Double Chooz, in particular detector simulation capabilities and high flash-point liquid scintillator, to the 
development of a compact antineutrino detector for safeguards named Nucifer
63
. The emphasis of this design 
will be on maintaining high detection efficiency (~55%), good energy resolution and background rejection. 
Nucifer will be commissioned against research reactors in France during 2009-2010, including the 70 MWt  
OSIRIS reactor at Saclay in 2009 and possibly the ILL reactor in Grenoble. This last location is particularly 
interesting as the fuel used in the ILL is 97% 
235
U. Following the commissioning phase, Nucifer will be 
deployed against a commercial PWR, where it is planned to measure reactor fuel evolution using the 
antineutrino energy spectrum. 
5.5.5.4 Effort in Brazil 
 
An effort to develop a compact antineutrino detector for reactor safeguards is also underway in Brazil, at the 
Angra dos Rios Nuclear Power Plant
64
. This may also be a precursor to a second generation theta-13 
experiment. 
Several deployment sites near the larger of the two reactors at Angra have been negotiated with the plant 
operator and detector design is well underway. The Brazilian work is particularly interesting, since a third 
reactor is being built at Angra, at which space may be reserved specifically for an antineutrino monitoring 
detector, and because of the regional safeguards presence (ABBAC, the Agencia Brasileiro-Argentina de 
Contabilidade e Controle de Materials Nucleares) in addition to the IAEA. Regional agencies such as ABACC 
often take the lead in the development and testing of new safeguards technologies. 
5.5.5.5 Effort in Japan 
 
A prototype detector for the KASKA theta-13 experiment has been deployed at the Joyo fast research reactor in 
Japan
65
. This effort is notable, since it is an attempt to observe antineutrinos with a compact detector at a small 
research reactor in a deployment location with little overburden, addressing two of the declared areas of major 
R&D interest for antineutrino monitoring.   
 
6 Mid-Field Applications: Detecting and Monitoring Reactors From 1-10 km 
6.1 Introduction 
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Detection and monitoring of reactors in the mid-field, between 1 and 10 km, is complicated primarily by the 
substantially reduced antineutrino flux compared to near-field monitoring. Depending on the outcome of current 
experiments
28,42
 the phenomenon of neutrino oscillations may also affect mid-field cooperative monitoring, 
through a modest additional reduction in the observable electron antineutrino flux. Past oscillation experiments 
leave open the possibility of a systematic flux deficit due to oscillations as large as ~15% relative to the 
predicted flux assuming no oscillations
66
.  
 
In the mid-field, as for the near-field, we assume a cooperative monitoring regime which permits deployment of 
a detector at a suspect site. The aim may be to demonstrate that a country is not operating unknown illicit 
reactors, or that a known reactor or set of reactors is non-operational. Based on event rates and statistical 
considerations, these capabilities are the likely main focus of any future mid-field monitoring regimes. As 
shown below, precision power and fissile content monitoring require higher event rates than are likely to be 
accessible with practical detectors.  
 
Of course, other methods exist for remotely verifying the operation or non-operation of known reactors, 
including thermal and visible wavelength satellite surveillance
67
, monitoring of tritium releases and other 
radionuclides
68
, and even actual destruction of infrastructure, such as was performed recently (and 
cooperatively) in North Korea
69
. Satellites and air or water borne radionuclides may also be used to search for 
unknown reactors. In these contexts, the advantages of antineutrino based monitoring in the mid-field are 
similar to those claimed for near-field monitoring: the signal is an inevitable and unique indicator of the 
presence of an operating reactor, and can‘t be masked except by other reactors, nor imitated by any source other 
than reactors. Therefore, aside from destroying the reactor, the other approaches mentioned are more 
susceptible to masking or spoofing than antineutrino-based monitoring. For example, a determined proliferator 
could divert heat from a small reactor with underground cooling or other means, while radionuclide releases are 
susceptible to weather patterns, or might be captured to frustrate detection.   
 
In this section we consider detector characteristics and performance at the two extremes of the defined mid-field 
deployment range - one kilometer and ten kilometer standoff. We set signal and background performance 
targets and compare these with results achieved in existing experiments. With sufficient overburden, we show 
that existing technology allows deployment of detectors sensitive to 10 MWt reactors at one to ten kilometer 
standoff distances. We then discuss possible improvements in background rejection capability that might be 
obtained with more sophisticated detection methods.   
6.2 Reactor Signal and Background in the Mid-Field  
 
Following the prescription set forth in 3.1, we assume a reactor power of 10 MWt. For simplicity, we also 
assume that no other reactors are contributing to the background, although the analysis is easily modified to 
incorporate this possibility. At one kilometer standoff from a 10 MWt reactor, a 100 ton fiducial mass detector 
would detect approximately one event per day. At 10 kilometer standoff from a 10 MWt reactor, a KamLAND-
like antineutrino detector
8
 (1000 ton total mass, and 408 ton fiducial mass) would detect about one event per 
month. The Kamland detector is shown in Figure 18.   
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Figure 18: The Kamioka Liquid Scintillator Anti-Neutrino Detector (KamLAND):  Buried 1 kilometer under earth, in an old 
mine northwest of Tokyo, KamLAND (Kamioka Liquid Scintillator Anti-Neutrino Detector) is the largest scintillation 
detector ever constructed. KamLAND is highly instructive for remote monitoring applications, since it unambiguously 
demonstrates long range reactor monitoring - albeit with reactor powers higher than those of likely interest in 
nonproliferation contexts. In particular, KamLAND clearly measures antineutrino flux from reactors in Japan and Korea at 
hundreds  of kilometer standoff.  
 
For both standoff examples, the intrinsic detection efficiency for antineutrinos is assumed to be 85%, similar to 
the demonstrated efficiency of the KamLAND detector. Assuming no observed events, a background-free 
detector with an expected signal rate of 1 event per day or month, would allow exclusion at the 95% confidence 
level of a reactor at one and ten kilometer standoff distances within three days or three months respectively. 
This conclusion remains valid as long as the expected background rate is comparatively low – for example, 
close to 95% confidence would still be achieved in the same time windows with 0.5 or fewer background events 
per day or month at 1 and 10 kilometer standoff respectively. The KamLAND reactor antineutrino experiment 
demonstrates that detectors of the necessary size and background rate for the entire range of mid-field detection 
can be built with current technology.  
 
To further understand the performance and scaling properties of mid-field reactor monitoring detectors, it is 
useful to consider the KamLAND backgrounds in more detail. KamLAND background rates from two different 
analyses are summarized in Table 6. The CHOOZ detector background rates are also shown for comparison
7
.  
 
 
Detector Fiducial 
Mass 
(ton) 
Overburden  
(mwe) 
Total  
background rate 
Correlated muogenic 
background rate 
Accidental  
background rate 
KamLAND ‗038 408  2700 0.4 per month 0.4 per month 0.002 per month 
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KamLAND ‗0670 706  2700 5.5 per month 4 per month 1.6 per month 
CHOOZ 5.5 ton  300 2 per day 1.8 per day 0.5 per day 
Table 6: Background rates achieved in the CHOOZ and KamLAND detectors.  
As shown in Table 6, backgrounds may be divided into correlated (muogenic) and uncorrelated or accidental 
backgrounds, with the accidental backgrounds arising primarily from radioactive elements within and 
surrounding the detector. At KamLAND depths, backgrounds are seen to be dominated by the correlated 
muogenic events, which include spallation neutons and various long-lived activation products. The relative 
suppression of accidental backgrounds is especially pronounced if a severe fiducial mass cut is made, as was 
done in the first (2003) KamLAND analysis. Below a few meters of overburden, after which the hadronic 
components of the cosmic ray background are screened out, backgrounds scale primarily with the underlying 
muon rate. Since higher backgrounds than were achieved in KamLAND can be tolerated at kilometer standoff 
distances, the most expedient simplification relative to the KamLAND design is to bury the detector at a 
shallower depth, in order to reduce excavation costs.  
 
For example, in order to achieve a target background suitable for 1 km monitoring, of approximately 0.5 event 
per 100 ton mass per day, the required depth is about 600 meters (1600 mwe), which is about the depth of the 
neutrino experimental halls at the Waste Isolation Pilot Project plant (WIPP)
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 site in Carlsbad, NM.  Figure 19 
shows the scaling of muon flux for various experiments as a function of depth.  
 
 
Figure 19: The muon intensity per square meter and second at various underground experimental sites worldwide, plotted 
versus the depth of the experiment in m.w.e.. Kamioka is the site of the KamLAND antineutrino detector.  WIPP is the Waste 
Isolation Pilot Project underground site in Carlsbad, N.M. Further information on the other experiments can be found in 
Table 4.  
 
6.3 The Effect of Reduced Overburden on Backgrounds and Detector Performance 
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Throughout the 1-10 km mid-field range of interest, existing and proven designs such as KamLAND could be 
adapted for cooperative monitoring purposes with little or no modification, provided only that suitable 
underground deployment sites were available. However, excavation costs makes up a large or even dominant 
fraction of the total cost of buried detectors. For example, the Braidwood neutrino oscillation experiment 
estimated a 23 M$ construction cost of four detectors comprising 260 tons fiducial mass, compared with a 35 
M$ cost for two shafts and experimental halls at a depth of 450 mwe
72
. Therefore, for reasons of expense and 
ease of deployment, it would be preferable to deploy on or near the Earth‘s surface. In shallow or surface 
deployments, the detector would have to be designed to allow rejection of the large backgrounds due to cosmic 
radiation. This problem of above-ground or shallow-depth detection is similar to that discussed for the near-
field in Section 5.5.3.2, but is made considerably more difficult by the larger detector size and reduced event 
rate compared to near-field deployments. It is also important to note that while reducing overburden is a strong 
cost consideration, the channel count and complexity of the detector can also considerably raise construction 
and operating costs. The following discussion is meant to explore some of the detector-related considerations in 
this trade-off, rather than prescribing a specific path to deployment. In some cases, burial will remain the 
simplest and most cost-effective approach. 
 
The background radiation at or near the surface of the earth is composed of cosmic and terrestrial components. 
The terrestrial component, arising primarily from decays of uranium, thorium and potassium and other 
radionuclides, depends strongly on the composition of local materials, but does not differ much from that in 
existing underground antineutrino detectors. For inverse-beta detectors, the relative rates from KamLAND and 
Chooz in Table 6 show that internal backgrounds can be kept at or below the level required for mid-field 
monitoring. While care must be taken to ensure pure materials and to control contaminants such as radon, the 
ambient radioactive component of the background does not present any unsolved technical challenge, and we 
need not consider this background further. The muonic component of the cosmic background at shallow depths 
is increased by about 3-4 orders of magnitude relative to the KamLAND depth. This steep dependence on 
overburden is seen in Figure 19. In addition to the increased muon rate, a significant change in the character of 
the cosmogenic backgrounds occurs in the last 5-10 mwe of overburden near the Earth‘s surface. As shown 
earlier, only about 63% of the cosmic ray flux at the earths surface comes from muons – the rest comes from 
neutrons, electrons/gamma-rays, and other hadrons. Below roughly 5 mwe, the muonic component of the 
backgrounds dominates the total flux, since most of the hadronic flux has been screened out. In this 
circumstance, the cosmogenic antineutrino-like background arises primarily from secondary fast neutrons 
induced by these muons as they pass through the detector and nearby materials. Above 5 mwe, temporally 
complex and spatially extended cosmic ray showers, arising from hadronic interactions further complicate the 
background rejection problem.  
  
In small detectors, the charged components of the cosmic ray background (muons, electrons, protons and pions) 
are relatively easy to suppress using thick passive shields or veto techniques, while maintaining good signal 
efficiency. For 100 ton or 1000 ton scale detectors, however, the need to veto signals arising from typical 
cosmic ray fluxes of 1-2 x 10
2
 m
-2
 s
-1
 , with veto windows having typical durations of 100 microseconds or 
more, quickly increases dead-time to intolerable levels. For example, a cubic 100 ton scintillator detector at the 
Earth‘s surface would have a 65% dead-time arising from muons alone, assuming a 100 microsecond veto 
window. A cubic 1000 ton detector would have 100% dead-time with the same veto window.  
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Part of the background in a surface detector arises from the secondary neutrons produced by hadronic 
interactions in the atmosphere, and by muon interactions with surrounding materials. At sea level, the 
cosmogenic secondary neutron flux is some 100 times greater than it would be after only about 4 m of rock 
overburden. These high background rates confirm that the leading problem in designing a surface or near-
surface midfield detector is to suppress cosmogenic backgrounds in the detector, and that simple veto strategies 
will not suffice due to the dead-time these strategies incur.   
6.4 R&D needs for mid-field detectors 
 
Here we describe some possible approaches for reducing backgrounds at shallow depths, while maintaining 
tolerable deadtime. The most promising directions are:  
 
 reducing dead-time by vetoing only segments of the total detector rather than the entire detector. 
 improved identification of the particle types for the initial and final state positron and neutron.  
 
One way to achieve both goals is with a highly segmented detector, and the use of two types of scintillator – the 
first sensitive primarily to neutrons, and the other to electromagnetic interactions. Segmentation keeps the 
cosmic veto rate local and manageable, thereby reducing the dead time effects, since only small sections of the 
detector need to be vetoed following a background interaction. Judicious choice of segmentation will also allow 
rejection of the dominant fast neutron signals in the detector. The use of two scintillators allows event by event 
particle identification, providing more specific identification of the positron-neutron pair that characterizes the 
antineutrino interaction. Below we provide one possible design that serves to illuminate some R&D directions 
of interest.  
6.4.1 A possible detector design for improved background rejection 
 
One possible design for a segmented detector is shown in Figure 20.  
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ZnS(Ag) 
scintillator 
with 6Li 
loading
Liquid organic scintillator  
with pulse shape 
discrimination
~10 cm
~ 1 m
A single voxel
 
Figure 20: A possible design for a segmented detector element incorporating particle identification features.  
The design consists of a series of liquid scintillator cells, whose walls are coated with a neutron-sensitive 
scintillator such as 
6
LiZnS(Ag). Because ZnS is an inorganic scintillator, the signal produced by neutron 
absorption (a triton, 
3
H, and alpha particle with a total Q value of 4.8 MeV) is not heavily quenched, as it would 
be in an organic scintillator. As a result, the light signal produced by neutron interaction is very large. 
Conversely, the range in the scintillator of the alpha and triton are very small (< 10 microns), and it is possible 
to dope ZnS with sufficient concentrations of 
6
Li such that efficient thermal neutron absorption will occur in 
relatively thin layers. Since it would be nearly impossible for a gamma-ray to deposit more than a few 100 keV 
in a thin (< 1mm) ZnS layer, the net effect is that ZnS is a neutron-only detector. Furthermore, it is a very 
efficient neutron only detector, since all of the reaction products of neutron interaction are contained in a thin 
layer. This situation contrasts with that for the more common homogeneous gadolinium-based antineutrino 
detectors, in which the neutron-induced signal, consisting of a gamma-ray cascade following capture, is not 
specific to particle type. Moreover, unliked gadolinium-doped detectors, the localized nature of the interaction 
in the inorganic scintillator allows for complete containment of the event within a single voxel.  
6.4.1.1 The antineutrino signal  
 
The basic principle behind this segmented design is to create distinct and physically localized sets of signals for 
the antineutrino interaction and for each type of background. We first describe the essential features of the 
antineutrino interaction. When an antineutrino interacts via inverse beta decay with one of the protons in the 
liquid scintillator it will produce a positron (with a stopping distance of approximately 1 centimeter or less in 
the liquid) and a neutron. With a judicious choice of voxel dimensions (say 5 centimeter in diameter), the 
positron will slow and annihilate in a single voxel. The positron will produce a fast decaying ―electron-like‖ 
light pulse in the liquid scintillator which is distinguishable via pulse shape discrimination from the slower 
decaying light pulse produced fast neutron recoils. The antineutrino-induced neutron will slow and be captured 
by the 
6
Li in the ZnS scintillator on the walls of the very same voxel in which positron energy deposition 
occurred, because the length scale for the slowing of a positron is comparable to thermalization length for the 
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neutrons produced in inverse beta decay. Thus, the unique signature of an antineutrino interaction in this 
detector is an electron-like event (as determined by pulse shape discrimination) followed by the capture of a 
neutron in an adjacent detector wall.  
6.4.1.2 Fast neutron interactions 
In a conventional homogenous scintillator detectors, fast neutrons induce proton recoils in the organic 
scintillator, then thermalize and capture with nearly the same statistical behavior in time as the neutron 
produced in inverse beta decay. Thus, the signature of a fast neutron may closely mimic an anti-neutrino event 
in such detectors. However use of pulse shape discrimination in a ~5 cm voxel should allow reliable 
differentiation between proton recoils and electron-like events, with a resolving power of about 1 in 10
4
 in the 
best liquid scintillators. Furthermore, it is very unlikely that a fast neutron will lose all (or even most of its 
energy) in a single scattering event, so that most neutrons will undergo scattering events above threshold before 
thermalizing over a length scale of tens of cm. Thus, segmentation combined with pulse shape discrimination 
should effectively discriminate fast neutron interactions from true inverse beta decay antineutrino interactions. 
6.4.1.3 Muon and fast electron interactions 
In our proposed detector design, muons (and other minimum ionizing events), would be identified by the 
topology of their energy deposition within the detector. We would expect muons to travel relatively undeflected 
through a large number of detector segments. As noted earlier, we would deliberately avoid use of a 
conventional muon veto system where a few large paddles provide muon rejection, because such a system 
would have intolerable dead time effects in a near surface installation. Instead, only a subset of voxels would be 
paralyzed during the passage of a muon.  
6.4.1.4 Long-lived cosmic-ray activation products 
As occurred in the KamLAND detector, 
9
Li and 
8
He can be generated by cosmic rays, then beta-decay in 
associated with a delayed neutron emission from the beta delayed daughter. The decay time constants are 178 
ms and 119 ms respectively. The combination of MeV-scale beta emission with the time-correlated neutron can 
produce an antineutrino-like signal. These backgrounds require further study, but might be rejected without 
fully vetoing the detector because they will occur within a few centimeters and milliseconds of the associated 
reconstructed muon track in the detector.  
6.4.1.5 Gamma-ray backgrounds 
As mentioned earlier, ambient gamma-ray backgrounds are similar for a near surface detector as they are for an 
underground detector and do not present a more serious background at the surface than underground. 
Nonetheless, gamma-rays in combination with the high neutron background at the surface could present special 
difficulties due to accidental coincidences between these independent event classes. Further study of these rates 
in specific detector designs is required.  
 
6.5 Summary for Mid-Field Applications 
In this section we reviewed some of the technical issues associated with deploying a large inverse beta decay 
detector at or near the surface that would be useful in a mid-field detection scenario (1-10 km). We conclude 
that existing detectors could be used for discovery or exclusion of small reactors throughout the mid-field, 
provided they are relatively deeply buried (100s of mwe).  To reduce costs associated with excavation, we 
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considered detectors with improved background rejection capabilities for the dominant cosmogenic 
backgrounds, which increase quickly towards shallower depths. Since at these depths local detector shielding 
alone is insufficient for reasons of deadtime, segmentation techniques appear to offer promise for improving 
specificity for the antineutrino signal, reducing deadtime and backgrounds, and thereby reducing overburden 
requirements in the mid-field. While segmentation offers a logical and promising R&D direction, we note that 
we have not examined other background rejection techniques in detail, such as development of new materials or 
readout systems capable of improving particle identification in unsegmented detectors.  
7 Far-Field Applications: Detecting Reactors and Explosions at 10 – 500 km  
 
The distinguishing features of far-field applications are: 
1. Detector sizes are tens of kilotons for tens of kilometer reactor standoff distances, and tens of megatons 
for hundred kilometer distances, and 100 megatons for 500 kilometer distances; 
2. Event rates at the level of a few per month for the small reactors of likely interest, even in very large 
detectors; 
3. Neutrino oscillations must be taken into account; 
4. Detector related backgrounds, and real antineutrino backgrounds from other reactors play a more 
important role; and, 
5. Unlike near-field and mid-field applications in which there are examples of detection capability down to 
10 MWt reactor power, no antineutrino detectors have been built larger than the 1000 ton KamLAND 
detector, nor neutrino detectors larger than then 50 kiloton Super-Kamiokande detector
d
. However, 
instruments at the 100 kiloton to megaton scale are now being considered or proposed to  study a wide 
range of fundamental physics topics.  
 
The overlap of this work with fundamental neutrino and dark matter physics is discussed in Section 8. Here we 
discuss the state of the art in antineutrino detection relevant for far-field monitoring, and consider specific 
monitoring examples. We then examine the prospects for fission explosion monitoring, and conclude with a 
review of the necessary R&D paths for far-field nonproliferation applications.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
 
d
 As discussed in this section, large Water Cerenkov neutrino detectors such as Superkamiokande must be modified to make them 
sensitive to the antineutrino signature.  
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Goal Required Antineutrino 
Event Rate 
#/Yr Detector Mass 
     10 KT 1MT 100 MT 
Detect Operation ~1yr ~5 /yr ~5 70 km 800 km >>1000 km 
25% accurate estimate of total annual energy 16 /yr 16 35 km 400 km >>1000 km 
Detect reactor shutdown within ~1 week > 10/day 3600 6 km 60 km 600 km 
Table 7:  Required fiducial detector masses for several possible remote reactor monitoring goals for 10 MWt reactors. 1000 ton 
scale liquid scintillator antineutrino detectors (KamLAND, Borexino) exist now; 10,000 ton (10 Kton) detectors are a 
straightforward extrapolation of this technology and are now being developed by several groups worldwide. 1,000,000 ton ( 1 
Megaton) Water Cerenkov detectors are also being considered by several groups for fundamental physics studies. 100 Megaton 
detectors are not currently being considered.  For the first two options, the background is assumed to be 1 event per year from all 
sources. Relative to the KamLAND detector,  this would require background suppression by factors of 10, 100 and 1000 , 
increasing with detector size. Since cosmogenic backgrounds dominate,  suppression could be achieved by burying the detectors at 
3 km water equivalent, compared to the 2 kilometers water equivalent depth of the KamLAND experiment.   
 
We begin our discussion with reactor monitoring. The example introduced in Section 3.1 sets the required 
detector scale: exclusion of the presence of a 10 MWt reactor within an 800 kilometer radius, with no other 
reactors present, would require a one megaton water Cherenkov or liquid scintillator detector, with 
backgrounds suppressed by a factor of 100 compared to the KamLAND detector. As seen in Table 6 and 
discussed below, it is important to note that the dominant source of backgrounds derives from cosmogenic 
activation, which can be suppressed by additional overburden.  While large, this detector mass could be 
achieved by building about three modules of about 600 kilotons, as presently proposed for various physics 
purposes (and discussed in Section 8).   A Super-Kamiokande
29
 sized detector (50 kTon), modified to be 
sensitive to antineutrinos, could measure the integrated power output of a 10 MWt reactor with 25% statistical 
precision, out to a distance of  about 100 km.    
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Figure 21: The predicted average antineutrino flux worldwide arising from known nuclear reactors. The color contours show 
the antineutrino interaction rate per 10
32
 proton per year, or about that of a 1000-ton detector per year. The red indicates 
areas where there are dense concentrations of reactors in France, the eastern United States, and Japan. Data are modeled 
based on known reactor powers, and are not from antineutrino flux measurements.  
 
The large scale examples above (1 and 100 Megatons) assume successful suppression of non-antineutrino 
backgrounds by 2-3 orders of magnitude relative to the current state of the art, and no reactor antineutrino 
backgrounds.  In fact, reactor antineutrino backgrounds vary widely across the globe. Figure 21  shows the 
global antineutrino fluxes from all known reactors worldwide. These fluxes are an additional background 
beyond the detector-related backgrounds discussed in Section 6.2. Absent a directionally capable detector 
(discussed below in 7.6), they are irreducible without resorting to multiple detectors. An exception to this rule 
discussed in arises if the number of collected events in the detector is sufficiently high, in which case the 
specific signature due to neutrino oscillations can be used to provide some range information for a distributed 
set of reactors. 
 
North Korea, South Korea, Japan and France would clearly be difficult locations for reactor monitoring due to 
backgrounds from large numbers of power reactors. However, monitoring in developing countries may have no 
significant local reactor antineutrino contributions (as for example in Africa and generally in the Southern 
hemisphere.) The reactor-related backgrounds can thus be quite small out to standoff ranges of hundreds of 
kilometers.  Even where these backgrounds are considerable, under many circumstances subtraction of known 
reactor signals is possible with a few percent accuracy, Power declarations for known reactors are currently 
required for IAEA safeguards. The same accounting could be performed more directly and with increased 
reliability if local antineutrino monitoring were available at each reactor.    
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For most of our long range monitoring examples, the detector mass has been set to provide the minimum 
number of events possible to determine reactor presence or operational status. With the higher event rates made 
possible by very large detectors (tens of megatons) in the few hundred kilometer range, we can in principle take 
advantage of neutrino oscillation phenomena to separate the signature of closer target reactors from those 
background power reactors at greater distances.  In the next section, this idea is illustrated with the hypothetical, 
topical and difficult example of a hidden reactor in North Korea. 
7.1 Discovery of an undeclared reactor in North Korea, including backgrounds from 
reactors in South Korea, using antineutrino rate information  
 
Having introduced an example in the previous section incorporating only detector-related backgrounds, we now 
consider remote monitoring of North Korea. North Korea is chosen as an enduring and well known proliferation 
problem, and as an especially vivid indication of the confounding problem of reactor related backgrounds. We 
emphasize that many places in the world would allow deployment of the few hundred kiloton to  megaton scale 
detectors discussed above, due to the substantially reduced reactor-related antineutrino backgrounds and more 
favorable siting requirements. The example described here concerns only standoff, reactor power and detector 
performance. We make no assumptions about cooperation from North Korea or neighboring states nor the many 
other practical obstacles that would have to be overcome for such a deployment to occur.  We assume that 
cosmogenic backgrounds are reduced by burial of the detector at 50% greater depth than currently deployed 
KamLAND detector, and that either liquid scintillator technology could be used, or that background suppression 
in water Cerenkov detectors is achievable at the same level as KamLAND.  The latter assumption in particular is 
far from being demonstrated.  
To reduce as much as possible backgrounds from the large installed capacity in South Korea, we assume that a 
large and deeply buried detector could be built in southern China, near the North Korean border. The 
deployment scenario is shown in Figure 22. The detector size of 10 megatons allows 8 standard deviation 
confidence of detection of a sole 10 MWt reactor in Yongbyon above backgrounds, where both detector-related 
and other reactor backgrounds are accounted for. Reactor backgrounds are assumed to be fully reported by 
neighboring cooperative states, in this case primarily South Korea (with a small contribution  from Japan). 
Exploitation of correlations amont rates in a smaller (Megaton scale) array of detectors would actually serve the 
purpose even better. The detector related backgrounds are scaled from the KamLAND experiment (2003 
analysis, see Table 6 above), The background estimate includes the suppression effects of recent purification 
efforts at KamLAND, which reduce radon and associated backgrounds and also assume 50% greater depth (3 
km water equivalent, or about 1 km of rock, compared to the actual KamLAND depth of 2 km water 
equivalent). Total backgrounds are estimated at about 1% of the remote reactor signals. The estimated power 
reactor generated backgrounds are based on known South Korean reactor thermal power ratings. One may also 
assume cooperative reporting of daily power production by these reactors, which aids in background 
subtraction.Table 8 shows the expected signal and background rates. 
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Figure 22: A hypothetical deployment sensitive to a 10 MWt in Yongbyon, North Korea. The size of the detector (or array of 
detectors) is 10 Megaton. A one year dwell time would achieve an 8 sigma measurement of a 10 MWt reactor at the indicated 
location.  Included in the calculation are backgrounds from all South Korean reactors, with sites in South Korea indicated by 
the orange triangles, as well as detector related internal and external backgrounds, using a rate per unit mass extrapolated 
from the KamLAND experiment.   
 
 Annual rate in a 10 megaton detector 
at 4 kmwe depth  
Yongbyon 10 MWt reactor 1900  events 
background from ~38 GWt of S.K. reactors 185,000 events 
Cosmogenic and internal backgrounds  12000 events 
Fluctuations in total background  450 events 
Statistical significance after one year  ~ 4 S.D. 
Table 8: The signal and background rates in a hypothetical 10 Megaton detector deployed at 131 km standoff from an 
unacknowledged 10MWt  reactor in Yongbyon, North Korea. The depth is chosen to make cosmogenic backgrounds negligible 
compared to reactor backgrounds. The statistical significance is determined solely by counting statistics. Antineutrino 
oscillations provide greater resolution, as discussed in the text. 
 
Not included in this rate analysis is the time variation of known backgrounds, such as the South Korean power 
reactors.  In the KamLAND experiment, the predicted neutrino flux varied by about a factor of two over several 
years timescale, as reactors went down for service and due to problems.  This temporal signature further 
strengthens the analysis, but has not been employed in the present simulations. 
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7.2 Discovery of an undeclared reactor in North Korea, including backgrounds from 
reactors in South Korea, using spectral information  
 
Neutrino oscillations, which change the type or ‗flavor‘ of the antineutrino as a function of distance and energy, 
have been observed with reactor antineutrinos and are discussed in Chapter 8. When one has an expected signal 
in the range of a thousand or so events, employment of neutrino oscillations provides a powerful tool to further 
distinguish signal from backgrounds, even when the total number of signal events is small (~ percent) compared 
to background. The detector, still 10 Megatons in this example, would have to achieve energy resolution 
comparable to the KamLAND detector, so that a water based system would probably not be feasible. 
Nonetheless it is interesting to consider the spectral analysis technique in the far field.     
There are many ways to do this analysis. Here we employ optimal filtering in the energy distribution.  With a 
known reactor antineutrino background, including the now well measured oscillations which distort the 
antineutrino energy spectrum, an optical filter or a correlation function can be convolved with the observed 
spectrum. This filter will yield a peak at the distance of the ―unknown‖ reactor, with an amplitude proportional 
to the reactor power. 
 
 
Figure 23: Left: Correlation function versus distance for the hypothetical example of a 10 MWt reactor at 131 km distance and 10 
GWt background reactors at 1000 km distance.  One clearly sees the signatures of both background reactors and the “hidden” 
reactor at the unknown 131 km distance , with the ranging accurate to a few kilometers. Right: Ten examples of Monte Carlo 
simulations of one year of data in the example above.  This plot demonstrates that with these high count rates,  statistical 
fluctuations are negligible. 
 
These correlation functions can be further improved. The shape of the signature versus distance is exactly 
equivalent to a point spread function (PSF) in, for example, radio astronomy.  Techniques have been refined to 
deconvolve the PSF, using for example the ‗maximum entropy method‘73 or the ‗CLEAN‘ algorithm74.  The 
latter seems particularly attractive for this application as it allows sequential subtraction of the peaks, revealing 
underlying detail. 
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The reactor distribution in this example is slightly simplified compared to reality, since South Korean reactors 
are distributed in at four main distances, rather than a single distance, as discussed here. Nonetheless the 
example illustrates the additional power provided by spectral filtering. Not yet exploited are the opportunities 
for inclusion of directional information (discussed in Section 3.1.6).  While we consider these various effects 
here separately (counting statistics, backgrounds with time dependence, range dependent spectral distortions, 
and directionality), a real monitoring program would employ all simultaneously in a Maximum Likelihood 
approach, squeezing as much information as possible from the data set.  It is difficult at this time to say how 
much this will add in analysis power, but 40-50% improvement seems reasonable. 
   
In summation we have shown that with next generation scientifically motivated instruments in the one megaton 
class (see Fig. 2), one could in principle monitor small reactors in the 10 MWt class out to ranges of order of 
800 km, and at ranges of a few hundred kilometers make more detailed assessments of operations. These 
statements assume that the ambitious energy resolution, background rejection and underground mine 
engineering goals of these detectors are all realized. The ongoing Conceptual Designs efforts related to these 
detectors will aid further and more detailed assessments of prospects for reactor monitoring. In the following 
sections, we discuss planned detectors that begin to approach scales of interest for far-field monitoring.  
7.3 Next Generation Large Liquid Scintillator Detectors 
 
In Chapter 6, we introduced the 1000 ton KamLAND liquid scintillator detector, in which current background 
levels allow sensitivity to 10 MWt power reactors throughout the entire 1-10 km mid-field range, even 
extending partially into the far-field (out to 30 km).  Next generation scintillator antineutrino detectors will 
likely be built on a scale roughly 10 times bigger. An example
e
 is the proposed 30,000 ton submersible 
Hanohano detector
75
, a schematic of which is shown in Figure 24. Assuming a fiducial volume of  10,000 tons, 
(extrapolated from the KamLAND self-shielding radius) and scaling rates from KamLAND estimates, 
Hanohano would have a 95% confidence exclusion range of about 70 km for a 10 MWt reactor in one year, 
assuming total non-reactor backgrounds comparable to KamLAND (including removal of radon in the latter 
experiment). However, in these deeply buried detectors, the non-reactor backgrounds depend primarily upon 
depth. Backgrounds from cosmic rays will be totally negligible below 4 km depth, and may be manageable at 
shallower depths. For example, the  KamLAND detector operates at about 2.7 km water equivalent depth. 
 The difficulty of background rejection increases at shallower depths, and this is an important element of future 
research and development, as discussed below.  
                                                   
 
e
 There are several multi-kiloton scale beingproposed antineutrino detectors worldwide. Hano-hano is unique in that it is submersible 
rather than being deployed in a deep mine.  
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Figure 24: The proposed ocean-going 10 kiloton liquid scintillator detector Hanohano.  Shown in cutaway profile, the 
cylindrical detector will be transported by a 100 meter long barge and lowered to depths up to 5 km for data taking.  The 
detector is designed for study of neutrinos from reactors and measurements of geoneutrinos from the Earth’s mantle.  It is 
mineral oil based, and is surrounded with large photo-detectors.  While the ocean-going engineering presents challenges, the 
detection technology is a straightforward extrapolation from the operating KamLAND instrument in Japan, and other 
detectors. 
 
 
As discussed in Section 8, the Hanohano detector is to be built primarily for antineutrino physics, geophysics 
and astrophysics studies. It may be the first experiment after KamLAND to demonstrate remote detection and 
monitoring capability for a single reactor, including measurement of the reactor operational status and power at 
distances of 50-100 kilometers. The Hanohano design has particular interest for nonproliferation applications 
because of its flexible deployment platform, which allows submersion of the detector at various locations and 
depths in the world‘s oceans. It will also give experience in the sort of large detectors that will ultimately be 
needed for nonproliferation, and will help further develop the expertise and the scientific personnel to carry out 
remote monitoring tasks of the future. 
 
An example deployment would be 55 km offshore of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station. (This distance 
was chosen to allow maximum sensitivity to neutrino oscillation parameters in a fundamental physics 
experiment.) At this distance, Hanohano would collect roughly 25 events per day for both reactors, which 
would easily allow determination of the operational status of either reactor within one day. While of little utility 
for nonproliferation, the example illustrates that relatively high statistics are achievable even at tens of 
kilometer standoff in next generation detectors.   
 
7.4 Next Generation Large Doped Water Cerenkov Detectors 
 
Beyond distances of a few tens of kilometers, and above detector masses of the order of 100 kilotons, the 
detection technology must almost certainly change from liquid scintillator to using a water base. The liquid 
scintillation medium has the advantages of being able to work with lower energy neutrinos (lowering the 
threshold from roughly 4-5 MeV in water Cherenkov detectors down to the inverse beta decay kinematic limit 
of 1.8 MeV), and to have roughly ten-fold better energy resolution.  One central consideration is cost: 
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photomultiplier tube coverage costs scale with the linear dimension of the detector squared, while the proton 
target mass goes as the cube.  Hence the cost of the organic liquid scintillator alone (at roughly $1/kg) will 
begin to dominate and eventually become prohibitive as one scales the size upwards. The cost of scintillator for 
a 100 kiloton detector is about 100 million dollars. Assuming 40% PMT coverage, and a cost of 10,000 dollars 
per square meter of PMT, the PMT cost for the same detector would be about 40 million dollars.  Therefore, 
water (at about 1% of that cost of scintillator) is the preferable target material for very large detectors.  
 
While large water Cherenkov detectors have been built and detected MeV-scale neutrinos, no large water-based 
detector has yet demonstrated reactor antineutrino detection. The largest presently operational low energy 
neutrino detector based on water Cherenkov technology (leaving aside ice Cherenkov technology for the 
moment, see below) is Super-Kamiokande
29
, shown in Figure 25. It has 50 kilotons gross and 22 kilotons 
fiducial volume and a present energy threshold of about 4.5 MeV.  It has been operating for over a decade 
(since 1996) and its operation is well understood. Studies of water Cerenkov detectors on megaton mass scales 
have been put forward in Japan
76
, the United States
77
 and Europe
78
. These or others may be constructed for 
neutrino physics studies in the next decade, with projected costs in the range of $500 – 1000 M.  
 
 
 
Figure 25 Super-Kamiokande is a joint Japan-US large underground water Cherenkov detector operating in Japan. The 
observatory was designed to search for proton decay, study solar and atmospheric neutrinos, and keep watch for supernovas 
in the Milky Way Galaxy. Super-Kamiokande is located 1,000 m underground in the Mozumi Mine (Kamioka Mining and 
Smelting Co.), Gifu Prefecture, Japan. The detector consists of a cylindrical stainless steel tank 41.4 m tall and 39.3 m in 
diameter enclosing 50,000 tons of ultra-purified water, with 13,000 large photomultiplier tubes. 
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To be relevant for far-field reactor monitoring, water Cherenkov detectors must be made explicitly sensitive to 
antineutrinos, using the inverse beta decay interaction of Equation (1). This requires the ability to detect 
neutrons in the water, in order to exploit the two-fold time-coincident signal generated by the positron and 
neutron, which signature is needed to distinguish the anti-neutrinos from many other sources which cause a 
single flash of light (particularly solar neutrinos). Doping with gadolinium (at the 0.1% scale) of large scale 
water detectors has been proposed as one way to make water Cherenkov detectors sensitive to neutrons. A 
detailed study of this option has been performed in consideration of a possible upgrade to the Super-
Kamiokande detector, known as the GADZOOKS detector
79
. As a small scale proof of the detection principle, 
an LLNL group has demonstrated water-based neutron detection, and sensitivity to inter-event time correlations 
identical to those produced by antineutrinos, using a 250 kg Gd-doped water detector
80
.   Other schemes have 
been proposed for neutron detection and for enhancing the light output in water Cherenkov detectors, and these 
are matters of active study at present. As demonstrated by Superkamiokande
81
, the achieved limit for light 
attenuation in purified water is roughly 80-100 meters, so that megaton scale detectors, with 100 meter linear 
dimensions, are not greatly affected by attenuation. However, it remains to be demonstrated that attenuation 
lengths are not affected by wavelength shifters, or, crucially, gadolinium doping. Moreover, larger detectors 
than 1 megaton would require modular construction or other expedients. Beyond the question of gadolinium 
doping, many other obstacles remain for scaling the technique to the megaton scale and beyond. The relevant 
research and development paths are discussed below in Section 7.6.  
 
On another front, a billion ton detector, the cubic kilometer IceCube instrument is nearing completion at the 
South Pole by a US-Europe collaboration
82
.  This instrument trades off sensitivity for size, with a neutrino 
detection threshold of a few GeV instead of our required energy down to a few MeV, and no current sensitivity 
to the inverse beta decay reaction. Despite its attractive dimensions, IceCube is unlikely to play a role for 
reactor monitoring applications. However, we return to the example of IceCube in section 7.5, with a 
discussion of its potential sensitivity to burst-like antineutrino phenomena in the few MeV range.   
7.5 Detection of Nuclear Explosions  
 
Nuclear explosion monitoring is an important element of the proposed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT)
83
 and similar regimes. A variety of on-site and remote sensor technologies can be and are already used 
for verification within such regimes. The technologies can be used to detect nuclear explosions conducted in the 
atmosphere, underwater, underground, or outer space. Depending on the geographical location and site access, 
explosive yields approaching 1 kiloton can be measured in some, though not all circumstances. Given this 
technology base, and the likely achievable capabilities of antineutrino detectors for explosion detection, 
antineutrino detection is likely to play at best a supplementary role in nuclear explosion detection in the near 
and medium term, most likely in cooperative contexts and as a confidence building measure. Its main possible 
advantages are unambiguous evidence of a fissile character of the explosion (rather than some other explosive 
or seismic event), and the ability to provide a competitive estimate of the device yield. In the discussion below, 
we briefly summarize the state of the art for remote nuclear explosion detection technologies, for the purpose of 
comparison with antineutrino based explosion detection. A more detailed comparative study may be found in 
[84]. 
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7.5.1 Atmospheric and Exoatmospheric Explosion Detection Technologies 
 
Several sensor types can be used to record the nuclear signature of an atmospheric or exoatmospheric explosion, 
seconds to days after the event. Bhangmeters, X-ray, gamma ray, neutron, and EMP detectors are space-based 
and designed to see the radiation from the explosion. Radionuclide sensors can detect the long-lived radioactive 
gases and particulates from the explosion. Since the Cold war era of intensive nuclear test activities, proliferant 
nations have avoided above-ground tests and instead pursued underground testing. The following technologies, 
as well as antineutrino detection, are suitable for detection of subterranean and underwater explosions.   
 
7.5.2 Underwater and Underground Technologies  
 
Within the global CTBT regime, there are five remote sensor technologies used for detecting and identifying 
underwater or underground nuclear tests: radionuclide, seismic, infrasound, hydroacoustic, and satellite 
imaging. Only radionuclide sensors can see an intrinsically nuclear signature from a fission explosion, and then 
only if the contained explosion accidentally vents into the atmosphere. The other four technologies can see 
various blast effects, but not direct nuclear radiation effects. Consequently, by utilizing evasion tactics such as 
decoupling, deeper burial, camouflage, concealment, and deception, it may be possible to conduct low-yield 
nuclear explosions underground that would escape detection altogether, or be incorrectly identified as non-
nuclear phenomena (e.g., earthquakes, rockbursts, and chemical explosions).
85
 
 
There have been at least three documented cases in which natural earthquakes were incorrectly identified as 
nuclear explosions: two in January and August of 1996 near the Russian nuclear test site at Novaya Zemlya, and 
a third by Pakistan on April 28, 1991.
86
 In addition to the occasional occurrence of false positives, false 
negatives are also possible - the incorrect classification of low yield underground nuclear explosions as 
innocuous events.
87
 Although seismic sensors have the best chance of detecting a low yield underground test, 
the relatively weak signal is not inherently nuclear and would be just one of the thousand estimated ambiguous 
seismic signals produced by earthquakes worldwide each year.
88
 As a result, the rare occurrence of a 
clandestine, underground nuclear test could be lost in the noise.   
 
7.5.3 A Role for Neutrinos 
 
The potential for ambiguity in seismic monitoring raises the question of whether antineutrino detectors might 
give useful supplementary information. The required detector size for a given standoff and number of events are 
shown in Figure 26. For example, detection of ten events from a 10 kiloton explosion at 200 kilometers would 
require a three megaton detector.  
Detection of even one antineutrino in coincidence with a blast, located and time-tagged by other means, would 
have important implications: one would know first that the blast was certainly nuclear, and one would know the 
yield within a factor of several.  With ten neutrino events, the yield would be determined within thirty percent, 
better than is typically achieved seismically. Unfortunately the detector sizes needed for standoff detection are 
daunting: roughly 10-100 times larger than the largest detectors now being proposed, and 1000 to 100,000 times 
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larger than state of the art antineutrino detector (KamLAND). A distributed array of such large anti-neutrino 
detectors offers the additional possibility of explosion location, as well as improved yield estimates.  For 
completeness Table 9 summarizes a set of possible nuclear explosion monitoring goals that could be enabled 
with such detectors.  
 
Of course, while assumptions differ slightly, the numbers of events expected and required have not changed 
since the 2001 study
84
 (leaving aside the relatively small correction now known to come from electron 
antineutrino oscillations, which is not included in our tabulated examples). The main advance compared with 
the earlier study is that megaton scale detectors, required for the simplest standoff detection goals for kiloton 
scale explosions, are now being considered by various groups for fundamental physics studies, which was not 
the case a decade ago. If such detectors are developed, antineutrino detection might someday provide a 
transformative additional capability for CTBT verification.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 26: The number of events which would be detected on average for a given detector mass, versus the distance from the 
explosion of a nominal 10 kiloton-TNT equivalent nuclear weapon.  Oscillation effects are not included in this crude estimate. 
The water based detector has an assumed energy cut of 3.8 to 6.0 MeV. The lower line would permit confirmation of the 
nuclear nature of the blast and a crude estimate of yield.  The green line, corresponding to 10 detected events, would allow 
autonomous detection and a 30% yield estimate.  The upper blue line for 100 events would permit a 10% yield estimate, and 
extraction of other information.
89
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Goal for a hypothetical 100 MT instrument    Number of Events    Range 
Detect explosion seen by other means  >1 evt in coincidence   1500 km 
Estimate yield to 30%  10 events    500 km 
Detect otherwise undetected explosion  5 events in 4 sec    700 km 
Estimate range for known yield, via number of events  10 events   +/- 15% 
Precision range, via oscillations  100 - 1000 events   +/- 1 % 
Location with 2 detectors  2 time >10 events  <250 km^2 
Details of explosion (using time & spectrum)  1000 events   210 km 
Table 9: Possible goals for detection of nuclear explosions with a hypothetical 100 megaton detector. Detectors on this scale are 
for now beyond the level now being proposed for  large antineutrino detectors in the fundamental science community. 
 
A final consideration in the context of explosion detector are very large detectors such as Ice-Cube
90
. As 
currently operated, these detectors are relatively sparsely instrumented with PMTs, and are therefore sensitive 
only to GeV-scale  or greater antineutrino energies. However, large detectors of this kind have been considered 
for MeV scale antineutrino detection, in the context of supernovae and gamma ray burst detection
91
. The 
essential idea is to search for very small but well-correlated fluctuations in response among many PMTs, 
induced by the pulse of antineutrinos engendered by some astrophysical event. This interesting idea merits 
further consideration in a nonproliferation context, since it might someday allow these very large scale detectors 
to be adapted to nuclear explosion detection.   
7.6 R&D Needs for Far Field Detectors  
 
The principal research and development avenues for far-field detection divide into issues related to sensitivity 
and those related to cost. Perhaps the most important advance, doping of water based detectors with gadolinium 
compounds, has already been discussed in section 7.4. Other important areas of research are summarized below.  
 
7.6.1 Background Suppression: 
 
By various methods, such as those discussed in Section 6.4, far-field detection requires suppression of 
backgrounds in large scale water Cerenkov and liquid scintillator detectors to levels comparable to or exceeding 
those achieved in the KamLAND experiment.  Methods have been developed for purification of scintillator 
liquids from radioactive materials (the most notorious being radon and decay daughters).  KamLAND, 
Borexino
92
 and SNO+
93
 groups have all made great progress in bringing high radiopurity to levels thought to be 
unachievable within the last two decades.  Backgrounds from detector boundaries and rock or water 
surroundings become less of a problem as detector size scales up, but material cleanliness remains an issue.  
Though well handled in present detectors, work is needed to make this a matter of industrialization in future 
huge instruments.   
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Cosmic ray muons and muogenic neutrons and isotopes decrease rapidly with depth.  As stated earlier, below 
about 3 km water equivalent depth these are not a problem.  At lesser depths they are more so, and from 
experience we know that they are manageable at depth of 2 kmwe.  Even shallower depths may be practical 
depending upon the size of the instrument and the target signal.  Further study is needed to determine just how 
shallow is tolerable. 
 
7.6.2 Development of event-by-event direction reconstruction for the antineutrino signal: 
 
 Antineutrino directionality is an extremely difficult problem to solve, but could transform concepts of operation 
by allowing real-time location of reactors and much improved background rejection. A simple qualitative 
analysis of the physics reveals the problem. The challenge lies in the fact that the direction of the recoiling 
neutron and positron is only loosely correlated with the direction of the incoming antineutrino. When 
directionality has been achieved, most notably by the Chooz experiment with a reconstructed half-angle of 
about 20 degrees
14
, this means that dozens or hundreds of events are required to extract the average direction of 
the antineutrino signal. For long range detection in which only a few events are available, this is obviously of no 
use. However, since momentum and energy are conserved in each individual event, it is possible in principle to 
reconstruct the antineutrino direction on an event-by-event basis. This essentially requires direct reconstruction 
of the positron and neutron momenta within the first few scatters following the antineutrino interaction, which 
in water and liquid scintillator occur within mere millimeters to a few centimeters of the event vertex. Thus 
what is required is a detector with a linear dimension of 10-100 meters, and position sensitivity on the scale of 
millimeters. Possible solutions included virtual segmentation via time projection chambers, or devices based on 
laser illumination and reconstruction of tracks, but the problem is clearly enormously difficult and no solution 
appears imminent.  
 
Concerning cost, the two dominant factors, at least for water detectors, are PMTs and excavation or, in the 
ocean, containment. This suggests a focus on the two following R&D paths: 
 
7.6.3 Low cost photodetection: 
 
 At present all large instruments use PMTs. These large (Super-Kamiokande uses 20 inch diameter tubes) are 
beautiful devices, low noise and have high photon detection efficiency.  But they involve significant mechanical 
complications, and the number required for a 10 Megaton detector would be very difficult to manufacture and 
handle.  The megaton class detectors mentioned above primarily anticipate using existing technology because of 
the long timelines for new devices.  The cost of the present devices is also intimidating, at about $1/cm
2
.  For 
example the cost of photomultipliers for a 10 megaton instrument would be around $1.1B. Progress is possible 
if increased funding and effort is directed towards advanced photodetection technology.  Indeed there is a lot of 
commercial activity in this area, often directed towards small pixel sizes – for example the tremendous 
revolution in CCD cameras.  The precision of dimensions required has been demonstrated by flexible circuit 
manufacturers, with the prospect for being able to make the needed acres of photodetector in rolls like wall 
paper. There are however many concerns about manufacturing, noise levels, lifetime, and other factors.  
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Ultimate manufactured costs have been estimated to be as low as a few cents per cm
2
, down by a factor of 10-
100 below those of present photomultipliers. Both within and beyond the neutrino detection community, there is 
great motivation to pursue this development. 
 
7.6.4 Ocean and Mine Tunnel Engineering: 
 
While the problems are different , deployments of large detectors in mines and the ocean will require significant 
engineering R&D to proceed. In the case of mine based instruments, many of the problems are already under 
active study in Japan (HyperK), Europe (LENA) and the United States (DUSEL).  There surely is a strong 
limitation on size of such detectors with reasonable cost, the present limitation being thought to be in the scale 
of one megaton.  Even at that size the excavation time becomes a problem (approaching a decade timescale).  
For the grand visions of detectors beyond the megaton scale it seems inevitable that such instruments be placed 
in the ocean.  There have been very preliminary studies of engineering at these sizes, but beyond about 1 
megaton (the mass of the world‘s largest oil tanker) is new territory.  We will not list the technical problems 
here, but simply state that while no in-principle problems exist, there are formidable engineering challenges 
including construction of giant bags, massive water purification, transportation, and other problems. One 
possible synergy comes from the large investments in underwater technology made by oil companies in recent 
years. 
7.6.5 Reducing overburden requirements:  
These approaches were discussed in Section 6.3 above.  
7.7 Summary of Far-Field Applications 
 
In this section we reviewed some of the technical and cost issues associated with deploying a large inverse beta 
decay detector at ten to several hundred kilometer standoff distance from reactors. We conclude that the several 
next generation detectors being proposed for physics experimentation might be useful for discovery or 
exclusion of small reactors in the far-field in some areas of the world. Of particular moment is the considerable 
and natural overlap in detector technology between the physics and nonproliferation applications. Sensitivity 
goals for hundreds of kilometer distant monitoring of small reactors with no other reactors present are currently 
beyond the state of the art, with the required detector masses roughly a factor of ten beyond the current state of 
the art. Portable next generation liquid scintillation detectors such as the proposed ten kiloton Hanohano can 
pursue fundamental physics topics while demonstrating and developing the technologies that move this area 
ahead. While affordability and allocations of national budgets ultimately relate to the desirability of the 
nonproliferation outcome, use of water Cerenkov technology, coupled with breakthroughs in the area of low-
cost photodetection, appears to be the most cost effective approach.  
8 Fundamental Physics and Reactor Antineutrino Detection 
 
The fundamental science developed with nuclear reactor antineutrino sources has provided many of the ideas, 
and much of the research and development funding that has made nonproliferation-related reactor monitoring 
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possible. Given the natural connection between the two fields at the level of technology, it can be expected that 
cross-pollination of this kind will increase over the next decade as new, more sensitive, detectors are built. 
Moreover, in a kind of reverse spin-off from international security applications to science, widespread 
deployment of antineutrino detectors for reactor monitoring could provide an important additional global 
resource for studying the fundamental properties of neutrinos. Here we summarize current and projected 
activities in the area of fundamental neutrino physics using reactor sources.  
 
Over the last ten years there has been considerable progress in understanding the physical properties of 
neutrinos. It is now known that neutrinos have mass, and that the three types of neutrinos ( e, ,  - paired 
with the lepton (e,µ,τ postulated by the Standard Model (SM) of particle physics do not correspond to the three 
types of neutrinos found in nature. Physical neutrinos propagate through space according to their mass. These 
physical neutrinos ( are now known to be quantum mixtures of the three types postulated by the SM. 
Thus they travel through space as ( but interact with matter as ( e, , Establishing this 
experimental fact was the culmination of over twenty year of measurements of neutrinos from the sun, and from 
cosmic ray interactions in the Earth‘s atmosphere. These pioneering (and somewhat astonishing) results have 
since been verified in detail with experiments using neutrinos from the sun, cosmic rays  nuclear reactors and 
accelerators. Current research that uses reactors as neutrino sources centers on measuring the amount of mixing 
between neutrino types, and in studying two other fundamental properties of neutrinos: their collective 
interactions with nucleons in nuclei, known as coherent scattering, and their magnetic moments. Here we 
introduce all three areas in turn, and discuss ongoing research in each, as it impacts nonproliferation missions. 
The list of ongoing experiments here is not exhaustive but is illustrative of the overlap in research and 
development between nonproliferation and fundamental physics applications. More comprehensive surveys of 
various neutrino experiments worldwide are available
94,
  
 
8.1 Neutrino Mixing  
Neutrino mixing, also known as neutrino oscillations, can be described as a mathematical transformation of 
vectors corresponding to the three different neutrino types or flavors. It occurs for neutrino flavors and for 
antineutrino flavors separately, so that the phenomenon can be observed with reactor sources. In the following 
paragraph, the word antineutrino can be globally substituted for the word neutrino.  
Physical neutrinos that interact with matter - including detectors -  can be represented as the three components 
of a vector. If we let the three axes of a coordinate system represent the three types of neutrinos in the SM ( e, 
, neutrino mixing can be thought of as a rotation of the physical neutrino vector in space. Geometrically, 
three angles can be used to describe such rotations, which are conventionally labeled and . The first 
two of these angles have been measured while the third is as yet unknown. Thus there is currently a program to 
increase the measurement precision for the first two angles and make an initial measurement of the third angle, 
Some of this work has and will be done at nuclear reactors, and is described below. The experiments all use 
the inverse-beta reaction – as do proposed reactor monitoring detectors. In addition, much of this program 
requires a high precision knowledge of the antineutrino reactor flux and its variation with reactor type, fuel 
loading, and operational history – essentially the same types of measurements needed for non-proliferation 
monitoring. 
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 Neutrino Mixing: 
 
This neutrino mixing angle has been measured both using solar neutrinos and at nuclear reactors via neutrino 
oscillations.  In this process, the physical neutrino flavors travel at different speeds through space (since they 
have slightly different masses) with the result that the admixture of flavors varies at every point along the path 
of the neutrino beam. Such a process has been dramatically demonstrated by the KamLAND detector in Japan, 
first introduced in Section 6. This detector used the combined flux from many Japanese nuclear reactors at a 
distance of roughly 200 km to show that such oscillations were indeed taking place. They showed that the 
mixture was a function of energy consistent with the form predicted by neutrino oscillations.  
 
The detector consists of 1,000 tons of organic liquid scintillator viewed by roughly 2,000 phototubes (figure 1). 
The detector is surrounded by an active water-based detector as a cosmic ray veto – and the whole assembly is 
located 1 km under a mountain  at the Kamioka Observatory in central Japan. 
 
 Figure 2 shows the resulting best measurement
95
 of what is essentially based on the KamLAND 
reactor measurement and the solar neutrino data. The y-axis is the mass difference between the main two 
neutrinos involved. The mass difference is known to about 7% and the angle (32 degrees) is known to about 
9%.  
 
 KamLAND is still operating, but it is not ideally placed
g
 to make the most precise parameter 
measurement and the main focus is now on neutrino measurements relevant to solar astrophysics. Thus there 
may be ―medium baseline‖ experiments for precision measurements of . Hanohano, discussed in 7.3,  is one 
example.  
 
Figure 27: The KamLAND detector for reactor antineutrinos. It has a fiducial mass in the 1,000 ton range and can measure 
the summed neutrino signal from multiple commercial power plants several hundred kilometers distant
95
. 
                                                   
 
f
 There are small corrections due to the influence of the other mixing angles. 
g
 KamLAND is actually too far away – about 200 km on average whereas the ideal location is about half that distance. 
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Figure 28: The best fit results for the oscillation mixing angle theta 12 from KamLAND (left, shaded contours) and solar 
neutrino data (left, line contours). The right plot shows the combined data
95
.  
 
 Neutrino Mixing: 
 
has been measured to be very close to 45 degrees using a combination of cosmic ray and accelerator 
experiments
96,97,98
.  
 
 is the only angle not yet measured. Since experiments that seek to measure the exact ordering of the neutrino 
masses, or that want to look for matter-antimatter asymmetry (CP violation) in neutrinos must first know the 
value of this parameter – there is intense scientific interest in making this measurement as soon as possible. 
 
There are three different methods for approaching this problem:  
1. a long-baseline (roughly 300-800 km)  accelerator experiment with a neutrino beam with mean energy 
roughly 500-1500 MeV,   
2. a precision reactor antineutrino experiment at a detector distance of about 1 km which looks for rate and 
spectral variations in the antineutrino signal, induced by oscillations,  
3. a medium baseline experiment, 40-60 km from a reactor, that looks at antineutrino spectral distortions.  
 
Currently, all three approaches are being pursued and are at various levels of maturity. The first approach is a 
major new thrust for the United States Deep Underground Science Laboratory Long-Baseline experiments 
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(LBL-DUSEL)
99
. While the neutrino energy scales differ greatly from the MeV scale of interest for reactor 
monitoring, the LBL-DUSEL  experiments are designing large water Cerenkov detectors which are of potential 
interest for nonproliferation applications.  
 
Concerning reactor experiments of type (2), there are programs underway in China, Korea, and France. A 
typical detector (Double Chooz)  is shown in figure 3. This detector is of moderate size – about 3.5 meters on a 
side. They will detect neutrinos at a rate of ~90 day at a distance of 1 km from a  8.5 GWt nuclear power 
station.  
 
 
 
Figure 29: One Detector of the Double Chooz experiment. This experiment will make a very precise measurement of the 
antineutrino spectrum starting in late 2008. 
 
The effect of on the measured reactor spectrum and rate is expected to be on the order of 5% or less. 
Therefore understanding the flux as a function of reactor power and fuel loading is critical. In addition, there are 
also basic physics parameters (mainly the amount of recoverable thermal energy per fission and the neutrino 
spectrum from different fuel components) that impact the final sensitivity. Table 1 shows the systematic and 
statistical uncertainties achieved by the Chooz experiment in the 1990‘s100. Also shown are the expectations for 
an improved Chooz detector design now under construction. While this will improve results somewhat, the 
positioning of an identical detector near the reactor cores (before neutrino oscillation has a chance to occur) will 
have the greatest improvement on sensitivity (last column). 
 
Uncertainty Chooz Improved Chooz Double Chooz 
Neutrino spectrum 1.9% 1.9% <0.1% 
Number of protons 0.8% 0.5% 0.2% 
Detector efficiency 1.5% 1.1% 0.5% 
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Reactor power 0.7% 0.7% <0.1% 
Energy per fission 0.6% 0.6% <0.1% 
Statistical 2.7% 0.4% 0.4% 
TOTAL 3.8% 2.5% 0.7% 
Table 10: Systematic Uncertainties in the Chooz experiment, New Chooz detector, and Double Chooz (relative) 
 
Thus this area has two potential impacts on the sensitivity of non-proliferation detectors: (1) the design, 
building, and calibration of advanced detectors with unprecedented stability and resolution, and (2) the 
measurement of the absolute flux of antineutrinos as a function of energy at a position nearby the core. 
 
Note that the absolute flux measurement can be made because identical detectors are needed for the near and 
distant position, in order to cancel detector systematic uncertainties. This necessitates that a large detector (sized 
for 1 km distance) be built close to the reactor core (~200 meters). Thus these experiments will have as a by-
product high statistics, well-calibrated, neutrino spectra complete with fuel loading dependence. This presents 
an excellent opportunity for the non-proliferation community to obtain the precise data that could be used for 
monitoring with reduced reliance on  initial knowledge of the thermal power or the core design. Double Chooz 
collaborators from Brazil, France, Japan, Russia, and the U.S. are also interested in reactor monitoring 
applications. 
 
Hanohano
101
, with a proposed deployment location of 55 km from the SONGS reactor in California, is an 
example of a medium distance experiment of type (3). Its physics goals are to measure  via a spectral 
analyses. It would demonstrate robust remote deployability of large (10,000 ton) detectors of interest for 
nonproliferation.   
8.2 Supernovae Detection 
 
Supernovae detection is another area of fundamental research that has considerable technology overlap with 
nonproliferation. Although supernovae emit some 10
57 
antineutrinos, the (fortunate) remoteness of the event 
implies detector sizes on the multikiloton to megaton scale, similar to the requirements established earlier for 
nonproliferation. Moreover, supernova antineutrinos have mean energies of about 15 MeV
102
, close to the 
energy scale of reactor antineutrinos.  Supernova neutrinos emerge from the core of the nascent neutron star 
rapidly—within 10 seconds or so, roughly consistent with the exponential pulse from nuclear explosion.  
 
Detection of supernovae antineutrinos has already been accomplished with fairly large water Cerenkov 
detectors. In a remarkable breakthrough, the Kamiokande-II
103
 and the 10,000 ton IMB
104
 experiment both 
successfully recorded a few second burst of antineutrinos from supernovae 1987A. Next generation large water 
Cerenkov detector  proposals, such as Hyperkamiokande
76
,   the proposed U.S. water detector at the Deep 
Underground Science and Engineering Laboratory (DUSEL) in South Dakota
77
, and the European MEMPHYS 
detector
78
,  all include supernovae detection as an important element of their overall physics goals.   
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An additional feature of supernova neutrino detection, not shared by nuclear explosions, is the presence of all 
flavors of neutrinos and antineutrinos. It had been thought that these might provide geographic information 
about the nascent neutron star
105
, but recent theoretical work
106,107
 has suggested that flavor mixing and other 
effects will so thoroughly scramble the neutrino distributions that all flavors will emerge with roughly the same 
energy distribution. This wider range of neutrino flavors has motivated consideration of liquid scintillator based 
supernovae detectors. Liquid scintillator detectors would provide detection of both electron neutrinos and 
antineutrinos via charge current interactions, and of the mu and tau neutrinos and antineutrinos through neutral 
current interactions. Liquid scintillator detectors can detect lower energy antineutrinos than water detectors, 
somewhat improving detection efficiency for nuclear explosions and supernovae compared with water 
detectors. With such detectors, the energy spectra of the antineutrinos from an explosion could also provide 
information about the details of the actual weapon design.    
 
A large segmented detector such as the 15 kiloton NOVA detector
108
, with detector modules that are a few cm 
in cross section and 15 m long, might also provide additional background suppression and some directional 
sensitivity. The current NOVA detector design has only minimal shielding, relying on timing with a pulsed 
beam for background suppression. Substantial modification of the design, including 10-100 fold increases in 
size, and deep burial, would therefore be needed to enable explosion monitoring applications.  
 
8.3 Geo-Antineutrinos 
 
The 1000 ton KAMLand liquid scintillator detector described earlier, was the first to measure antineutrinos 
produced by radioactive decays of naturally occurring uranium and thorium isotopes from the Earth. The 10,000 
ton Hanohano detector, described in Section 7 is also expected to acquire geoantineutrino signals at one or more 
locations in the ocean. The geoantineutrino signal is expected to offer rich insights into the origin and nature of 
the Earth‘s crust and mantle109, and may ultimately be able to measure or rule out a geo-reactor postulated to 
exist in the Earth‘s core110.  
Geoantineutrino detectors are particularly relevant for nonproliferation since they are of necessity large - at 
minimum 1 kiloton -  and since the endpoint of the geoantineutrino energy spectrum, at roughly 3.3 MeV, is 
lower than that for nuclear reactors. The world‘s first geoantineutrino spectrum is shown in Figure 30, as 
measured by the KamLAND detector
111
. The large size and low energy threshold requirements for 
geoantineutrino detectors make them directly relevant for mid-field and far-field reactor monitoring 
applications.  
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Figure 30: A prompt energy spectrum from the KamLAND detector, reproduced from the Official KamLAND results website 
maintained at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory
112
. The prompt energy (see 4.1.3) is closely related to the antineutrino energy 
spectrum. This spectrum shows the low energy geoantineutrino signal (prediction in hatched blue), superimposed onto the 
reactor antineutrino spectrum, and demonstrates that inverse beta detectors capable of detecting geoantineutrinos can also 
measure reactor antineutrinos.  
 
8.4 Coherent Elastic Neutrino Nucleus Scattering 
There are several ongoing efforts to develop detectors to look for the predicted ―coherent‖ interaction of 
neutrinos with nuclei
113,114,115
. This elastic scattering process, predicted by the SM, would give rise to a large 
neutrino interaction rate at low energies – even in small detectors. Detection at such low energies is difficult, 
however. To date no experiment has successfully confirmed the existence of this reaction. It is noteworthy, 
however, that most astrophysical theories of stellar collapse supernovae require this type of scattering in order 
to transfer energy from neutrinos to stellar mantles during the collapse process – else the supernova just 
―fizzles‖ and never explodes. Thus there is strong interest in the astrophysics community of verifying this 
reaction – and reactors are a promising venue for this type of measurement to take place. 
 
If the wavelength of a low-energy neutrino is large enough it will react with an entire nucleus rather than with 
the individual nucleons. The cross-section for such a ―coherent‖ process rises approximately as the square of 
the number of nucleons in the nucleus. Thus at low energies it can exceed the inverse beta interaction cross-
section by 1-3 orders of magnitude, depending on the element. The increase in rate can be translated into 
smaller footprint detectors for reactor monitoring. For example, expressed in terms of the SONGS parameters 
described in Section 5.3.3, a 20 kg fiducial mass liquid argon detector could detect as many as 400 events per 
day, 25 meters from a typical commercial reactor core (3.4 GWt). After accounting for shielding requirements, 
this could lead to a factor of 5-10 smaller total footprint detector, when compared to detectors relying on the 
inverse beta interaction.  
 
The main difficulty in making the measurement is that most of coherent nuclear recoils induced by fission 
neutrinos transfer very little energy, typically less than 1 keV. For an ionization detector, this meager energy 
transfer results in very few free electrons. Noise-free detection of a few electrons, even at relatively high rates, is 
a serious experimental challenge. Analogous difficulty confronts scintillation and calorimetry based approaches.   
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Figure 31 shows one such detector concept, now under development at LLNL
113
. It would make use of a dual-
phase Ar detector, in which ionization electrons generated by coherent scatter interactions in liquid are drifted 
through a liquid-gas interface. Once in the gas, they are accelerated to create an electron cascade and an 
associated electroluminescence signal, which is detected by photomultiplier tubes. Detection using High Purity 
Germanium (HPGe) is also been pursued
114,115
.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 31: A proposed dual-phase argon detector for measuring neutrino-nucleus coherent scattering.  
 
The small detector size and/or high rates that are potentially achievable through coherent scatter mechanism 
make such detectors of possible interest for reactor monitoring. However, because the coherent scatter 
interaction is identical for all flavors of neutrino and antineutrino, it is important to point out that they suffer 
from a probably irreducible limiting background, arising from solar neutrinos. At standoff distances beyond a 
few kilometers from a GWt scale power reactor, the solar neutrino signal, which is indistinguishable from the 
reactor antineutrino signal in these detectors, will dominate the measured signal in any coherent scatter detector. 
This means that the utility in a nonproliferation context is likely limited to near-field applications, out to a few 
kilometers.  
8.5 Neutrino Magnetic Moment 
In addition to neutrino mixing, there is also a program of using reactor antineutrinos to look for a non-zero 
neutrino magnetic moment. Neutrinos, like neutrons, are electrically neutral. Unlike neutrons, they behave as 
point particles and have no (as yet) measurable magnetic moment. In some theories, neutrinos would have a 
very small magnetic moment – which might be detected via a deviation of the ―standard‖ weak interaction at 
low energies.  This type of experiment typically requires detectors with extremely low backgrounds and very 
high neutrino rates. This is because they need to use very low energy reactor neutrinos to achieve the required 
sensitivity – below the threshold of the inverse beta decay reaction.h They therefore rely on antineutrino-
                                                   
 
h
 1.8 MeV 
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electron scattering, which may be relevant for future non-proliferation detectors. The recoiling electron follows 
roughly the direction of the incident neutrino – allowing one to obtain the direction of the source. 
 
Two recent experiments that have conducted a search for a non-zero magnetic moment are the TEXONO 
experiment at the Kuo-Sheng reactor
116
  and the MUNU experiment at the Bugey reactor
117
 . These experiments 
concentrate on neutrino electron scattering interactions at low energy, so rates are typically a few events/kg/day.  
TEXONO used a High Purity Germanium (HPGe) detector of mass ~1 kg surrounded by an extensive active 
and passive shield (figure 5). The analysis threshold was 12 keV recoil energy with a useable signal to about 
120 keV. 
 
The MUNU experiment used a one cubic meter CF4 Time Projection Chamber (TPC) to image the tracks of 
recoil electrons (figure 6). Electron events associated with the reactor neutrino interactions were separated from 
background by making a cut on track direction. Although designed for 5 bars, this detector operated at 3 bars to 
improve tracking. Viable electron tracks were recorded to energies of ~ 1 keV when operating at 1 bar.  
 
 
 
Figure 32: The TEXONO detector at the Kuo-Sheng nuclear power station. The HPGe detector is used to detect recoil 
electrons down to an energy of 5 keV.[2] 
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Figure 33: The MUMU detector. A TPC installed at the Bugey reactor to look for evidence of a neutrino magnetic moment. 
 
 These types of detectors may not be useful for non-proliferation purposes in their present form. 
However, the ability to deduce the direction of the parent neutrino is a feature of the TPC detectors and may 
warrant further study in the context of reactor antineutrino monitoring. 
8.6 Other Physics 
 
Beyond neutrino searches, large water Cerenkov and scintillator detectors may be used in pursuit of a range of 
other physics goals. Correlated signals with Gamma-ray bursts, searches for proton decay
118
, monopoles
119
, 
quark nuggets
120
, and other phenomena have all been proposed using detectors similar in scale and design to 
those discussed in the preceding sections.  
9 Conclusions  
 
In this white paper, we have sought to demonstrate the breadth of ongoing activity in the area of antineutrino 
detection for nonproliferation, and the natural connection between this work and current and next generation 
detectors for particle astrophysics. The last decade has made near-field monitoring capability a reality. Albeit 
with considerable additional effort, the next decade may usher in reactor monitoring capabilities well beyond 
these cooperative near-field demonstrations. We hope this paper motivates the science and nonproliferation 
policy communities, as well as the global scientific community with an interest in neutrino and dark matter 
physics, to explore and where possible exploit the implications of this connection for both fields.  
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